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FREEDOM OF CONTRACTS
Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller
ABSTRACT

“Freedom of contracts” has two components: (1) the familiar
freedom to bargain for terms within a contract and (2) the long-neglected
freedom to choose from among contract types. Theories built on the first
freedom have reached an impasse; attention to the second points toward a
long-elusive goal, a liberal and general theory of contract law. This theory
is liberal because it develops an appealing conception of contractual
autonomy grounded in the actual diversity of contract types. It is general
because it explains how contract values – utility, community, and
autonomy – properly relate to each other across contract types. Finally, it
is a theory of contract law because it covers the field as a whole, including
for example marriage, employment, and consumer contracts, not just
arm’s length widget sales.
“Freedom of contracts” illuminates numerous puzzles in contract
doctrines from liquidated damages to promissory estoppel and across the
ABCs of contract types – agency, bailment, consumer transactions, etc.
Our approach also generates a range of novel theoretical propositions. For
example, it explains how sticky defaults and even mandatory terms within
a contract type can actually increase freedom, so long as law offers
sufficient choice among types. Finally, it offers law-and-economics
contract scholars a way to situate efficiency analysis within a normatively
appealing liberal framework. In sum, “freedom of contracts” suggests a
refocus of how contract theory should be pursued – and how contract law
should be designed and taught.
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FREEDOM OF CONTRACTS
Hanoch Dagan* & Michael Heller**
INTRODUCTION
Contract theory has lost touch with contract law. Existing theories
all fall short. Some fit poorly with doctrine; others are conceptually
muddled; the rest, normatively disappointing. Surveying the field, one
observer notes, “[T]oday there is no generally recognized theory of
contract,” and concludes, “The effort to develop a coherent explanation of
contract seems to have reached an impasse.”1
There is no impasse. A doctrinally well-fit, conceptually coherent,
and normatively attractive account of contract is in view. This Article
points the way through an approach we call “freedom of contracts.”
Freedom of contracts is the sum of two components, which together
constitute contractual autonomy: (1) the familiar freedom to bargain for
terms within a contract, and (2) the long-neglected freedom to choose from
among contract types.2 As we will show, attention to choice among types
can repair the broken link between contract theory and law.
We would like to claim the phrase “freedom of contract” – without
the “s” – but we leave the familiar term aside because of its troublesome
connotations. Outside the legal academy, “freedom of contract” largely
serves as a slogan for laissez-faire capitalism. Even within contract
theory, the term retains a particular libertarian flavor. It is most often
associated with freedom as negative liberty, that is, with the idea
“fundamental in the orthodox understanding of contract law, that the
content of a contractual obligation is a matter for the parties, not the law.”3
*

Stewart and Judy Colton Professor of Legal Theory and Innovation, Tel
Aviv University Faculty of Law.
**
Lawrence A. Wien Professor of Real Estate Law, Columbia Law School.
We thank * and workshop participants at * for helpful comments.
Thanks also to John Briggs, Swift Edgar, and Inbar Gal for research assistance.
1
Peter Benson, Contract, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 29, 29 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2nd ed., 2010).
2
These two components encompass a third, an overarching voluntariness
principle that is sometimes labeled “freedom from contract.” We discuss the role
of voluntariness in our theory in Part III.B.2, infra.
3
STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 59, 139 (2004). For an early
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In this view, contractual freedom “has very little to do” with contract law
and is thus perceived as “largely irrelevant” to its design.4 The law should
just enforce private deals and otherwise get out of the way. Freedom of
this negative sort is a non-trivial aspect of contracting. At times, people
really do want to bargain for terms within their own idiosyncratic deal and
they need the law to do no more than enforce their joint agreement.
But bargaining for terms is not the dominant mode of contracting,
and it should not determine, as it long has, the central meaning of
contractual freedom. Usually, when people enter contracts, they are not
designing their deal from scratch. For most of us, most of the time – if we
get married, start a new job, buy insurance, or click “I accept” –
contractual freedom means the ability to choose from among a
normatively-attractive range of already-existing contract types and then,
perhaps, make a few contextual adjustments. The mainstay of present-day
contracting is the choice among types, with each type using distinctive
doctrinal features to embody its particular normative concerns. For
example, we have waiting periods to dissolve marriage contracts,
limitations on employee noncompete agreements, “reasonable
expectations” doctrine in insurance contracts, and generous return rules in
consumer transactions. These doctrinal rules are not oddities to be
explained away. Rather, they are clues to and reflections of the divergent
normative concerns of each contract type.
Over the past century, contract theory has progressively lost touch
with the role of contract types. If you ask theorists about diverse marriage
contract types, many answer: that’s family law, not contracts. How about
employment contracts? That’s labor law. Consumer transactions? Part of
the regulatory state. Rather than embracing diverse types, contract theory
has shrunk its focus to a single universal, trans-substantive image – the
arm’s length commercial widget sale. Unfortunately, contract law
teaching has followed this scholarly lead and contracts casebooks have
incarnation of this view, see Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL
L.Q. 365, 368-69, 373 (1921).
4
Richard Craswell, Freedom of Contract, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW
AND ECONOMICS 81 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000). But cf. Randy E. Barnett, The
Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821
(1992).
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marginalized most real-world contracting practices from their explanatory
field.5 But contract law is not the shapeless, “general” law taught to
generations of first-year students. Diverse family, work, home, and
consumer contract types are at least as central to our shared contracting
experience as are widget sales. So, we reject the idea that the core of
contracting is dickering over terms in an arm’s length deal. While such
transactions are surely important, they are not the platonic type of any
contracting sphere, not even in commerce.
Attention to choice among types opens the door to a liberal and
general theory of contract law. To qualify as liberal, contract theory must
be grounded in an appealing conception of contractual autonomy.6 But
contractual autonomy is not self-defining. Just the opposite. Pinning it
down is tough, much tougher than the concept’s easy intuitive appeal
suggests.7 Existing liberal contract theories – primarily libertarian in the
United States and neo-Kantian in Canada and Europe – may fit well with
aspects of arm’s length contracting, but each fails when expanded to cover
contract law as a whole. Descriptively, they miss the texture of why we
contract with one another; conceptually, they overlook key features of
contractual autonomy; normatively, they slight the diverse goods of
contracting. These failures help explain why many law-and-economics
and communitarian contract scholars disclaim a liberal foundation to their
work. But the turn away from liberal principles is detrimental and
premature.
The first theoretical contribution of our approach is to offer a
liberal conception of contractual autonomy grounded in, and well-adapted
5

See LAWRENCE J. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 25 (1965)
(modern contract law courses are like “a zoology course which confined its study
to dodos and unicorns”); but see MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN
ACTION (3rd ed. 2011) (a rare contracts casebook still organized around types).
6
Liberalism as such need not be grounded in autonomy. But for contract
law in particular, we doubt that foundational alternatives such as political
liberalism can prove adequate, a point we discuss in Part IV.A, infra.
7
Cf. Mark Pettit Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the “Rise and
Fall”, 79 B.U. L. REV. 263 (1999). See also Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629,
641-42 (1943) (“freedom of contract must mean different things for different
types of contract”).
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to, the actual diversity of contract types. We start with the familiar
proposition that autonomy stands for the commitment that people should,
to some degree, be the authors of their own lives. One element of this
autonomy – reflecting the usual meaning of freedom of contract – involves
enforcing idiosyncratic deals. But contract law must do more if it is to
expand meaningful choices in service of our self-authorship. It must also
support freedom to choose from among normatively-attractive contract
types. The implications of this claim are stark. As a start, it means that a
state committed to human freedom must be proactive in shaping contract
law, including a robust body of diverse types. Sometimes, contract law
must support missing types (say to promote minoritarian or utopian
values), and sometimes it must limit choice so as to stabilize and channel
cultural expectations regarding a particular contract type. This insight
implies that, at times, sticky defaults and even mandatory terms within a
contract type can actually increase freedom, so long as – and this is crucial
– law offers sufficient choice among types.
The second conceptual contribution of this Article is to show how
a liberal contract theory can also be a general one. To qualify as general,
a theory must address the varied goods and diverse spheres of contracting.
Accordingly, we reject the notion that any single value – utility,
community, or even autonomy – suffices for a coherent general theory.
Instead, we relocate most of the normative discussion to a more correct
and productive level – relating to the diverse values that animate each type
and the recurring dilemmas common to each sphere. (By “sphere,” we
mean a core realm of life in which contract law can enrich how we
legitimately enlist others to our projects). It should be no surprise that the
values plausibly animating marriage, employment, and consumer
transactions differ from each other and from those driving commercial sales,
and further that, the contract types within a single sphere offer individuals
choices among divergent values. Indeed, it is the availability of distinct,
normatively-attractive types within each sphere – what we call intra-sphere
multiplicity – that is the core requirement of freedom of contracts.
One collateral benefit of this approach, and a major impetus for
this Article, is to offer law-and-economics contract scholars a more secure
and defensible normative grounding for their work. Much of contract law
is, and should be, driven by efficiency concerns, but a thorough-going
efficiency theory of contract has never been persuasive: autonomy and
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community concerns cannot be banished altogether if, for example, you
oppose slavery and endorse marriage. But how do these normative
commitments interrelate? Solving this puzzle constitutes the third
conceptual building block of this Article. While our liberal commitments
place autonomy as contract law’s ultimate value, we recognize that people
do not enter into specific contracts to become more free. Rather, they
contract mostly to achieve other values: utility and community. We show
how contract law can enhance individual autonomy while, at the same
time, providing economic and social benefits from robust contracting. For
law and economics theorists of contracts, we offer a path back from the
uncomfortable collectivist position implied by an exclusive focus on
wealth maximization, and give them a normatively appealing way to
situate efficiency analysis within a liberal framework.8
Finally, to qualify as a liberal and general theory of law, we take
seriously the generative and normative role of legal institutions. Prior
autonomy-based theories conflate ideal contract law with legal passivity,
that is, with the commitment that law aim just to enforce the parties’ wills
and maybe cure discrete market failures. By contrast, we show that it
must actively empower people’s relationships by shaping distinct contract
types. This approach provides a solid normative standpoint for reforming
existing contract law (considering the law in its best light possible, rather
than through its historical evolution). Doctrinal interpretation and
evaluation should look to the “local” animating principles of existing
contract types, rather than any “core” principle of contract law. While the
market for contractual innovation is vibrant, there is no reason to believe
that existing types either exhaust the variety of goods that people may seek
by contracting or are best configured to support their apparent goals.
This Article shows that robust contract law matters even more to
human freedom than has previously been understood. Part I examines the
contributions and limits of prior autonomy-based contract theories. Part II
explores the main goods people seek from contracting – utility and
8

Our approach does generate four substantial theoretical distinctions from
efficiency analysis, summarized at Part III.B.3, infra, and numerous novel
doctrinal reforms, collected at Part IV.C.1, infra, which should all be viewed as
friendly amendments for efficiency theorists willing to adopt a liberal foundation.
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community – and shows why neither works alone as the ultimate contract
value. Part III sets out our freedom of contracts theory and shows how
contract law plays a positive, active, and previously underappreciated
autonomy-enhancing role. Part IV addresses the main challenges our
approach faces and the opportunities it presents for law reform.
Throughout, we illustrate how our approach illuminates long-standing
puzzles in doctrines ranging from liquidated damages to promissory
estoppel and in the ABCs of contract types – agency, bailment, consumer
transactions, etc.
The “freedom of contracts” approach has several virtues: it offers
a normatively attractive view of freedom through law, a conceptually
coherent account of core contract values and their interrelationships, a
persuasive link between contract theory and contract law, and finally, a
path for contract law reform that brings it closer to our shared ideals.
I. CAN AUTONOMY BE THE CORE OF CONTRACT?
A note to readers: this Part attempt a delicate balance – we aim for
brevity and transparency so as not to exhaust the general reader’s patience,
while recognizing that no account of deontological autonomy is too
intricate for the neo-Kantian contract specialist. For those inclined to
press on to our positive theory, the takeaway can be briefly stated:
(1) Any modern liberal account of contract must start with Charles
Fried’s Contract as Promise.9 This work revived debate on the relation of
autonomy to contract, but failed to resolve the core normative concern,
that is, how to justify state coercion of promises. (2) Later liberal critics
tried to refine Fried’s account and develop a rights-based foundation for
contract law that does not rely on its contribution to enhancing individual
autonomy. (3) After thirty years, we can now say this deontological
detour has failed. But, (4) a liberal theory is still possible if we embrace
as its (teleological) foundation a well-tempered conception of autonomy as
self-authorship.
9

CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION (1981). See generally Symposium, Contract as Promise at 30: The
Future of Contract Theory, 45 SUFFOLK L. REV. 601 (2012).
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A. Fried’s Reset
The first and most enduring contribution of Contract as Promise
was to push back against generations of theorists – from Fuller and Perdue
in the 1930s through Gilmore and Atiyah in the 1970s10 – who sought to
fold contract into the fields of tort and restitution. At a moment when
critics had already announced The Death of Contract, Fried offered a
powerful moral justification, grounded in Kantian notions of individual
autonomy, for continuing to take contract seriously.11 Contract, as he
explained, increases individual autonomy by empowering people to enlist
others to their projects.12 This intuition is robust.13
Fried’s specific theory, however, has not held up as well. The
challenge for his Kantian “conception of the will binding itself,” which he
puts “at the heart of the promise principle,” is to justify the coercive
practices of contract law.14 For Fried, the commitment to keeping promises
is premised on the trust that a promise invokes regarding the future actions of
the promisor.15 This trust, in turn, can only be justified by reference to the
social convention of promising. Fried explains that this convention increases
our autonomy by expanding our options in the long run. Promising enables
us to achieve objectives that we can succeed in accomplishing only with the
cooperation of others.16

10

See generally L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance
Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936); GRANT GILMORE, THE
DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974); P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT (1979).
11
See FRIED, supra note 9, at 17 (justifying obligation to keep promises in
“basic Kantian principles of trust and respect”).
12
Id. at 8.
13
Thomas Gutmann, Some Preliminary Remarks on a Liberal Theory of
Contract, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2013) (arguing “the notion
of contract is inherently founded on the idea of two or more persons realizing
individual self-determination by means of voluntarily entering legally binding
agreements”).
14
FRIED, supra note 9, at 3.
15
Id. at 9.
16
Id. at 13-14.
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But why should the state coerce performance of the promise absent
detrimental reliance by the promisee? Why should free individuals not be
able to change their minds without liability? Fried recognizes the difficulty
in closing the gap between the moral value of promise and a state’s use of
coercion: the social value engendered by trusting promises does not “show
why I should not take advantage of it in a particular case and yet fail to keep
my promise.”17 Nonetheless, Fried continues, the individual obligation of
promise-keeping is grounded “in respect for individual autonomy and in
trust.”18 The promisor intentionally invokes a convention whose function is
“to give grounds – moral grounds – for another to expect the promised
performance.”19 To renege on a promise is, therefore, to abuse the trust and
thus the vulnerability of the promisee, both of which the promisor freely
invited; it amounts to wrongful exploitation of another individual. In short,
contracts – which are a genus of promises – must be kept because promises
must be kept; and promises must be kept because promising is “a device that
free, moral individuals have fashioned on the premise of mutual trust, and
which gathers its moral force from that premise.”20
Here’s the problem: from the Kantian perspective Fried occupies,
his formulation does not close the justificatory gap, but just relocates it. An
ethical duty not to abuse someone’s trust does not necessarily justify a legal
duty for the same.21 Thus, Fried’s rights-based commitment sits
uncomfortably atop a consequentialist foundation concerned with
maintaining trust.
By mixing together these incompatible moral
22
foundations, Fried opened the door for the deontological detour to come.

17

Id. at 14.
Id. at 16.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 17.
21
Benson, supra note 1, at 43-44.
22
We do not imply that there is no way to accommodate consequentialism
with deontology. For an interesting attempt, see EYAL ZAMIR & BARAK MEDINA,
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND MORALITY (2010). However, their approach to contract,
id. at ch.9, is quite different from ours.
18
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B. The Deontological Detour
1. Transfer theory. Following Fried, the core question has
remained: what justifies legal coercion of the promisor? While there have
been many answers, the key element they share is the notion that a
contract transfers something, some “thing.” Peter Benson offers one
version of the argument: first, he argues (contra Fried) that abusing a
promisee’s trust may be ethically blameworthy, but that blameworthiness
should not give rise to legal liability, absent detrimental reliance.23 As he
puts it, if “there is no basis for holding that nonperformance injures
anything that belongs to the promisee,” then there is “no basis for
concluding that the promisor should be made to hand over the equivalent
of the promised performance as a matter of compensation.”24
This view suggests Benson’s second point: that contract law –
which notably does enforce wholly executory contracts – can be justified
only if the contract itself already transfers from the promisor to the
promisee “a legally protected interest,”25 so that “performance respects
those rights whereas breach injures them,”26 and thus the transfer justifies
the state’s intervention to correct this wrong.27 If the theory works, it’s the
transfer, not the promise, that justifies state coercion on rights-based
grounds, wholly apart from consequentialist concerns like preserving trust
or enhancing autonomy.28 This is the core move not just of Benson, but

23

Peter Benson, Contract as Transfer of Ownership, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1673, 1682 (2007).
24
Id. at 1683. Jody Kraus, in defense of Fried, argues that the role of the ex
ante perspective in his account is limited to the background conventions that inform
the parties’ expectations and is thus compatible with the deontic commitment
simply to “vindicate the parties’ pre-existing rights.” Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of
Contract Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687, 728-29 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).
But this still does not explain why these expectations need to be forcibly enforced.
25
Benson, supra note 23, at 1683.
26
Id. at 1674.
27
Id. at 1707.
28
See Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive
Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 1077, 1111-12 (1989).
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also of all the “transfer theorists” following Fried.29 Their challenge has
been to explain what exactly contracts transfer and how they do so.
While transfer theorists vary in nuance,30 Arthur Ripstein, the
group’s most rigorous neo-Kantian, aptly captures their general
orientation. Contract, for Ripstein, is “the legal means through which
persons are entitled to make arrangements for themselves, and so to
change their respective rights and duties.”31 The starting point of his
analysis of contract – like the premise of his general theory of law – is an
individual’s right to personal independence.
Unlike more robust
conceptions of autonomy as self-authorship, Kantian independence is not a
good to be promoted but a constraint on the conduct of others, which is
exhausted by the requirement that no one gets to tell anyone else what
Against this background, contract gets its
purposes to pursue.32
significance by enabling free people to “set and pursue their own purposes
interdependently.”33 Here, consent is conceptualized as “two persons
uniting their wills to create new rights and duties between them.”34 A
united will can justify transfer of a preexisting right; it can also “create
new rights, including rights to things that need not exist as fully
determinate antecedent to the transfer.”35 Ripstein’s reasoning is complex,
but his bottom-line is simple: through a transaction based on a united will,
the promisee receives title to compel the promisor’s future performance.36
2. Three shared features. This brief summary suffices to highlight
three characteristic features of transfer theories. (a) As just mentioned,
transfer theorists are committed to the conceptual view that the act of
29

This term was coined by Stephen Smith, see SMITH, supra note 3, at 97-99,
but transfer theory relies on a rich natural law pedigree. See, e.g., Helge Dedek, A
Particle of Freedom: Natural Law Thought and the Kantian Theory of Transfer
by Contract, 25 CAN. J.L. & JURISP. 313 (2012).
30
See, e.g., Benson, supra note 23, at 1719-31.
31
ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 107 (2009).
32
Id. at 14, 34, 45.
33
Id. at 107.
34
Id. at 109. See also id. at 122-23.
35
Id. at 116.
36
Id. at 127. For a similar interpretation of Kant’s position, see ERNEST J.
WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 153-54 (2012).
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contracting transfers an entitlement to the promisee (either an entitlement
that pre-exists the contract,37 or one that the contract itself creates). This
point is the basis of their claim that breach must be understood as “an
interference with the promisee’s ownership interest acquired at contract
formation,” and thus an injury which the law corrects based on strict
adherence to the parties’ Kantian independence.38
(b) Next, transfer theorists converge also on at least one important
doctrinal point. While implicit in Ripstein’s account,39 the doctrinal point
explicitly engages Randy Barnett.40 He criticizes Fried for relying on “an
inquiry as to the promisor’s actual state of mind at the time of agreement” –
in contrast to the objective theory that dominates contract law.41 Barnett
uses this problem of doctrinal fit to assert a deeper deficiency in Fried’s
account: its inadequate attention to “the interrelational function of contract
law,” which both explains and justifies law’s use of “a manifested intention
to be legally bound” as the “criterion of enforceability.”42 There are many
steps between Barnett’s doctrinal observation and his positive account.43 We
omit them here and raise his work only to note that transfer theorists in
general endorse contract doctrine’s objective approach.
(c) The final, and most significant, commonality relates to shared
normative focus on negative liberty. Thus, for Barnett, the function of
contract doctrine is to set clearly “the boundaries of protected domains,”44
which means that it should “identify the rights of individuals engaged in
transferring entitlements, and thereby indicate when physical or legal force
may legitimately be used.”45 The significance for Barnett of clear
37

Some transfer theorists engage in acrobatic exercises to establish that, prior
to contracting, the transferred entitlement belonged to the promisee. See, e.g.,
Benson, supra note 23, at 1693-1719; Andrew S. Gold, A Property Theory of
Contract, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 1, 31-42, 50-53 (2009).
38
Benson, supra note 23, at 1707.
39
See RIPSTEIN, supra note 31, at 124, 126.
40
Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
269 (1986).
41
Id. at 272.
42
Id. at 320.
43
See id. at 303, 306.
44
Id. at 302.
45
Id. at 295.
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boundaries emerges from his commitment to Nozickian individual
independence, in which individual rights require that “the boundaries
within which individuals may live, act, and pursue happiness [are] free of
the forcible interference of others.”46 Barnett’s libertarian account finds a
nice echo in Ripstein’s Kantian commitment to an individual’s right to
independence. Though the paths differ, their normative views largely
converge.47 Both call for a sharply limited, passive role for the state in
providing contract law – the law is morally justified in doing no more than
enforcing the deal to which the parties have mutually consented.
C. Why the Deontological Turn Fails
This concerted effort over the past thirty years to craft a rights-based
account of contractual autonomy, purged of Fried’s covert teleological
moves, has reached a dead end. The failure is unsurprising because
transfer theory is question-begging; and without transfer as a premise,
deontological contract theories collapse into a freestanding and
normatively-dubious version of libertarianism. Our critique focuses here
on transfer theorists’ conceptual and normative claims. (Their doctrinal
point regarding the objective basis of contract law is widely accepted,48
and we also endorse it for reasons that become clear below.)
1. The conceptual muddle. The conceptual claim of transfer
theory fails in two ways. (a) The first has to do with the non-self-defining
nature of ownership. All transfer accounts ground contract in ownership,
either ownership of one’s future actions or of the right the contracting
parties create. They assume our “sole and despotic dominion”49 over these
entitlements, such that we can wholly transfer them, and such that law
should back up that commitment. But why?
46

Id. at 291.
Ripstein is eager, however, to distinguish himself from Nozick by, for
example, defending anti-discrimination rules. See RIPSTEIN, supra note 31, at
292.
48
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 cmt. b; E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 115 (4th ed. 2004).
49
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
*2 (University of Chicago ed., 1979) (1765-69).
47

[9/12/2013 Draft]

FREEDOM OF CONTRACTS

13

Neither the range of transferability, nor even its inclusion within
the scope of an owner’s entitlement, is self-defining.50 Ownership (and
property) is open to competing interpretations and permutations. There is
no inevitable content to the concept – even Blackstone never had a simple
Blackstonian vision of ownership51 – and no arbitration among the
different available conceptions is possible without pre-commitment to
some normative apparatus.52 Viewing contract as a transfer of ownership
just buries contract’s moral underpinnings in a naïve view of property.53
Reducing contract to property is no more promising than the pre-Fried
reliance theorists’ turn to tort and restitution.
(b) The second conceptual problem with the deontological turn,
even more crucial for our current purposes, is its problematic
understanding of contract law. In line with Fried’s notion that contracts
must be kept because promises must be kept, transfer theorists’ accounts
suggest that contract is duty-imposing.54 While analyzing tort law
doctrines dealing with our bodily integrity in these terms may make sense
– assuming people have such pre-legal and pre-conventional rights, tort
law affirms the correlative duties against their violation – contract law

50

For a provocative argument along these lines, see J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA
PROPERTY IN LAW 88-90 (1997) (arguing that the right to sell is not
conceptually inherent in ownership, but the right to give is).
51
See Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxieties,
108 YALE L.J. 601 (1998); David B. Schorr, How Blackstone Became a
Blackstonian, 10 THEO. INQ. L. 103 (2009).
52
Nothing here should be interpreted as supporting the view that property
is just a “laundry list” of substantive rights with a limitless number of possible
permutations. See generally HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND
INSTITUTIONS pt. I (2011).
53
Neo-Kantians have attempted to develop a conception of property that is
securely detached from any consequentialist concerns. See RIPSTEIN, supra note
31, at chs. 4 & 9; WEINRIB, supra note 36, at ch. 8. But such accounts prove
implausible. See DAGAN, supra note 52, at 63-66.
54
See Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and
Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726, 1726-27 (2008). This feature is
conspicuous in the understanding of contracts Seana Shiffrin has advanced in
recent years. See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and
Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007).
OF
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works differently.55 Rather than vindicating existing rights, contract law is
first and foremost power-conferring.
We agree that duties not to interfere with people’s rights are relevant
to contract law, but they are secondary. Rules concerning duress, fraud
and the like, which aim at ensuring that people not be forced into
contracts, do impose duties. However, these duty-imposing areas of
contract doctrine rely on the same normative commitments that explain
and justify law’s support for allowing people to self-impose obligations in
the first place.56 Even more fundamentally, these piggy-backing (dutyimposing) rules – which safeguard contracts’ voluntariness – would be
meaningless in the absence of (power-conferring) contracts: their role is to
protect our ability to apply the powers enabled by contract, and they
would be pointless in a world that does not recognize the power to
contract.
As a power-conferring body of law, contract law “attaches legal
consequences to certain acts” in order “‘to enable people to affect norms
and their application in such a way if they desire to do so for this
purpose.’”57 This feature captures the empowering role of contract that
Fried identified and Jody Kraus later highlights. As Kraus explains,
contract is “a particularly valuable means for pursuing ends,” because by
recognizing people’s power to undertake obligations, it allows individuals
to provide credible assurances “to induce promisees to assist them in
realizing their ends.”58
Does the objective theory of contract undermine this conceptual
point? We think not. Here’s the potential difficulty, per Gregory Klass: a
55

See Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1603, 1608-09, 1614-15 (2009). See also Daniel Markovits,
Making and Keeping Promises, 92 VA. L. REV. 1325, 1352-66 (2006) (launching
an analogous critique of T.M. Scanlon’s harm-based theory of promises and
contracts which neglects the reasons for making contracts). But cf. Curtis
Bridgeman & John C.P. Goldberg, Do Promises Distinguish Contract from
Tort?, 45 SUFF. U. L. REV. 885, 888 (2012) (arguing that contract is powerconferring and is still “organized around the moral duty to keep promises.”).
56
See Klass, supra note 54, at 1765; Kraus, supra note 55, at 1619.
57
Klass, supra note 54, at 1739 (citing JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON
AND NORMS 102 (1975)).
58
Kraus, supra note 55, at 1608-09.
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purely power-conferring doctrine should be designed to “ensure that a
person’s acts result in legal change only when it is her purpose to achieve
such a change,” whereas contract law merely “ensures that a significant
proportion of actors . . . are likely to have such a purpose.”59 The
objective theory of contract fails to “include mechanisms to prevent
inadvertent exercises of the power.”60 Nevertheless, it does not undermine
our claim. As Kraus argues, “making subjective intent a necessary
condition for making a promise” would have frustrated “the point of
promising” or at least severely limited its role only to “individuals who
make promises to people who already trust them.”61 Therefore, promisors
“would choose to make their promises objectively binding.”62
Kraus does acknowledge the downside of objective theory to
personal autonomy: it undermines “the negative right of individuals
(merely objective promisors) to be free from subjectively unintended
obligations.”63 But as Kraus asserts, the law justifiably follows the
prescriptions of “personal sovereignty” – the conception of individual
autonomy on which promissory morality relies64 – to “give priority to
respect for the positive liberty of faultless individuals” who “choose to
undertake objectively binding promises,” over the “negative liberty of
blameworthy individuals.”65 Contract law cannot be neutral in such a
zero-sum contest, and given the inter-subjective context in which it
operates, it correctly opts for the objective theory.66
2. The normative link. This conclusion not only explains the secure
status of objective theory, but also reveals why deontologists’ resistance to
considering consequences – even consequences to people’s autonomy –
cannot work. Contract is irreducibly concerned with power-conferring
59

Klass, supra note 54, at 1730.
Id. at 1754.
61
Kraus, supra note 55, at 1620-21.
62
Id. at 1623-24.
63
Id. at 1624.
64
Id. at 1609.
65
Id. at 1624-25.
66
By contrast, in unilateral contexts – think about mistaken payments cases
with no detrimental reliance – private law (here, restitution) traditionally does
vindicate the transferor’s subjective intent. See generally HANOCH DAGAN, THE
LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 40-45 (2004).
60
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rules; even Ripstein begins his account by stating that contract is the
“means” that entitles persons “to make arrangements for themselves, and
so to change their respective rights and duties.”67 In certain contexts –
especially in close-knit groups – these rules may be conventional (social
norms enforced notably via the parties’ reputational concerns).68 In many
others, contracting heavily relies on the law, so that by subjecting
themselves to the potential deployment of “the powerful institutionalized
mechanisms” of contract law, people who have no preexisting reason to
trust one another can cooperate, and each can rely on the other’s
rationality as the sole necessary safeguard.69 Moreover, even for parties
guided by their own social norms, contract law often provides background
safeguards, a safety net for a rainy day that can help catalyze trust in their
routine, happier interactions.70 Thus, law (or a law-like social convention)
shapes, and does not merely reflect, the interpersonal practice of
contracting, and in designing contract law, we necessarily make choices
that affect the contours of the parties’ bilateral relationship.
The relevant question for an autonomy-based contract law is not
what constraints to people’s autonomy are legitimate (as it is for many
aspects of tort law); rather, it is how should contract law enhance people’s
autonomy.71 That is necessarily an ex ante discussion dealing with the
ways law can facilitate forms of bilateral voluntary obligations that are
67

See RIPSTEIN, supra note 31, at 107; see also Benson, supra note 1, at 37
(“Autonomy theories view contract law as a legal institution that recognizes and
respects the power of private individuals to effect changes in their legal relations
inter se, within limits.”).
68
See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations and Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract
Law and the State of Nature, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 5 (1985).
69
DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL
THEORY OF CONTRACT 55, 58, 60, 65 (2003). See also, e.g., Michael G. Pratt,
Promises, Contracts and Voluntary Obligations, 56 L. & PHIL. 531, 572 (2007).
70
Cf. Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110
YALE L.J. 549, 578-79 (2001).
71
Cf. JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN
CONTRACT DOCTRINE 234 (1991). See also Richard Craswell, Contract Law,
Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 489
(1989) (arguing theories which found the binding force of promises on individual
autonomy “have little or no relevance” to most parts of contract law).
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conducive to contract’s autonomy-enhancing telos. This inquiry is
qualitative, rather than quantitative (it is not about maximizing the amount
of autonomy in the world). But it is teleological nonetheless: we are
looking for the system that generates the most autonomy-friendly
implications.72
Libertarian contract theorists, like Barnett, may admit that law
matters and still endorse a minimalist role for contract law – along the
lines of the boundary-crossing principle suitable for Robert Nozick’s
night-watchman state.73 But there is nothing particular to contract law that
justifies this view. If a minimalist libertarian view of the state appeals to
you, then Barnett’s view could plausibly inform your approach to contract
law.74
Notice the tectonic shift in the nature of this last argument: we are
now seeking a normatively-attractive view of individual autonomy to
guide the state in shaping its contract law. Because contract law confers
the power to create new rights, this power cannot be defended from an
autonomy perspective without engaging with its implications on people’s
autonomy. That’s indeed quite a different path from the one taken during
the deontological detour, but it’s the right way for contract theory to go.
More strongly, it’s the only way to go for a liberal theory of contract, and
it’s where we turn next.
D. A New Autonomy?
Back when Fried was introducing his promise theory, Joseph Raz
was developing a conception of autonomy as self-authorship, a view
which has gained prominence because it provides both a compelling
account of our most fundamental right and a coherent justification for an

72

We believe that justification for the moral obligation of promise-keeping
is similar, but our intervention in the vibrant philosophical industry on this
question must await another day.
73
See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
74
Note that you would not be following Nozick who backed away from his
early views. See ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE: PHILOSOPHICAL
MEDIATIONS 286 (1989) (“The Zigzags of Politics”).
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active, modern, liberal state.75 However, when Raz applied his view to
contract law, the result was problematic, suffering from some of the same
difficulties as his deontological counterparts. Nevertheless, Raz provides
useful building blocks for liberal contract theory, even though he did not
adequately link them to his own robust conception of autonomy. Here we
evaluate three threads in Raz’s scattered and brief remarks on contract.
1. Three Threads. Raz’s first claim is that the purpose of contract
law is not to enforce promises, but rather “to protect both the practice of
undertaking voluntary obligations and the individuals who rely on that
practice.” 76 The shift implies that law should prevent the erosion of this
practice by protecting the “special bond” between the parties that requires
“the promisor to be, in the matter of the promise, partial to the
promisee.”77 Law’s role in “making good any harm caused by [the] use or
abuse”78 of the practice of undertaking voluntary obligations is justified if
and only if “the creation of such special relationships between people is
held to be valuable.”79
While Raz does not elaborate on the justification for invoking law
to protect and facilitate this practice, we can nevertheless tease out a
second proposition: it “enable[s] individuals to make their own
arrangements”; and these “special bonds between people,” which “are
voluntarily shaped and developed by the choice of participants,” are
morally desirable.80 Why? It seems he finds the practice of promising
valuable due to both its autonomy-enhancing function and the type of
relationships it creates.81 So far, we agree.
75

See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
Joseph Raz, Promises in Morality and Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 916, 933
(1982) (reviewing P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981)).
77
Joseph Raz, Promises and Obligations, in LAW, MORALITY, AND
SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 210, 227-28 (P.M.S. Hacker & J.
Raz eds., 1977).
78
Raz, supra note 76, at 933.
79
Raz, supra note 77, at 228.
80
Raz, supra note 76, at 928, 936; see also Joseph Raz, Voluntary
Obligations and Normative Powers (pt. 2), 46 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 79,
101 (Supp. 1972).
81
Raz’s recent work on promise shares some of the premises of the transfer
theorists – analogizing promise to a property conception of gift – and thus shares
76
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Raz’s third proposition – the point where we part ways – relates to
the role of contract law. For Raz, such law “is primarily supportive,” an
unfortunate echo of the deontological approach. The practice of
promising, he claims, “is like ownership and the family, which are [all]
rooted in moral precepts and in social conventions.” Therefore, the main
task of contract law for Raz is “recognizing and reinforcing . . . the social
practice of undertaking voluntary obligations.” While he acknowledges
that contract law is not “merely passive” – it can influence the social
practices it supports, reinforce and extend such practices, and make them
more reliable – for Raz, by and large, contract law should not be
understood as “an initiating system, as a means of creating and changing
social arrangements.”82
This final proposition must be rejected for the same reasons we
have rejected its deontological counterparts. Contract law is already far
more active than Raz recognizes. He states as “fact that the law of
contracts operates predominantly in a supportive . . . role.”83 But this is no
fact, as we argue below, and it is a good thing too. To serve the very
purpose and values that Raz ascribes to contract law – promoting
autonomy as self-authorship – the law needs to be, as it already is, more
active than Raz acknowledges.
2. What’s next? It is time to admit the failure of the ambitious
deontological effort. If the proper meaning of autonomy is merely as a
constraint, contract may well be impossible, or rather unjustified. But it is
neither. Raz’s account points toward an appealing alternative, even
though his efforts to link it to contract law faltered.
Our way forward is to develop a theory of contracts building on
this conception of autonomy as self-authorship. Such a theory answers the
classical question of contract theory – on what grounds does the obligation
of agreement-keeping arise? The answer, simply, is that “making
agreements is instrumentally valuable.”84 The value that contract serves is
similar limitations. See Joseph Raz, Is There a Reason to Keep a Promise?, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT (Gregory Klass et. al eds.,
forthcoming 2014).
82
Raz, supra note 76, at 916.
83
Id. at 934.
84
Cf. Markovits, supra note 55, at 1368.
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autonomy: law (or any pre-legal convention we should respect) empowers
individuals, as Fried argued, to make agreements that facilitate their ability
legitimately to enlist one another in pursuing private goals and purposes –
and thus contract law enhances our ability to be the authors of our own
lives. This seemingly simple statement encapsulates one of the most
difficult challenges of contract theory: just as self-authorship requires the
ability to write and rewrite our life-story, contract law enables us to make
credible commitments while safeguarding our ability to start afresh.85
Being teleological in this sense implies that individuals do incur
some burden for the common good. But in the context of contracts, this
burden is minimal; as we have seen, it simply requires that people not
invoke the power conferred on them by contract law if they do not intend
to comply with its rules.86 Further, unlike other teleological accounts of
contracts, our focus on contracts’ unique, autonomy-enhancing function
easily explains why a contract creates a duty in the promisor and to the
promisee: after all, only in this way can contract enable each one of us in
particular to enlist specific others for our goals.87
Contract serves autonomy by enabling people legitimately to enlist
others in advancing their own projects and thus it expands the range of
meaningful choices people can make to shape their own lives. That’s an
important claim, but a preliminary one. To round out a general, liberal
theory of contract, we need to know why people want to enlist others in
their projects.
II. THE GOODS OF CONTRACT
What are the main goods we seek when we exercise the power to
contract? Contract theory must identify these goods, explain how they
85

See infra text accompanying note 188.
See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
87
Cf. Markovits, supra note 55, at 1328, 1348 (Markovits claims that this
means the essence of all contracts is relational, a claim we criticize in Part II.B,
infra). Neo-Kantians (and maybe other corrective justice scholars) are still likely
to object, insisting that our theory violates private law’s correlativity (or
bipolarity). In reply, see HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM & RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW THEORY ch.5 (2013).
86
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relate to each other, and link them to the ultimate value of autonomy.
Only then can we talk about tailoring contract law to meet its normative
potential. In this Part, we show how utility- and community-based theories
are best understood as essential building blocks in a robust autonomyenhancing conception of contract. 88 This argument is not a comprehensive
survey of the pertinent scholarship, nor does it dive deep into the subtle
nuances of the accounts we cover. Our mission is more limited and focused:
to show how utilitarian and communitarian theories of contract can be reread
as accounts of the goods of contract an autonomy-based theory must
recognize and facilitate.
By focusing on utility and community, we do not deny that other
values may be justified in affecting contract doctrines. But autonomy,
utility, and community (as we render them) are different from other
values: they participate in law’s vision of the ideal interpersonal
relationships of contracting parties and thus are qualitatively distinct from
“external values,” that is, values arising from outside the contractual
relationship. Although “internal values” need not enjoy a strict monopoly
in shaping contract law as some private law purists claim, they are, and
should be, privileged, such that external values should affect the contours
of contract law only if they pass a heightened justificatory bar.89
A. Utility
1. The relationship between utility and autonomy. Some
economic analyses of contract law conceptualize the field – explicitly or
implicitly – as a complex set of incentives. In this view, these incentives
should aim at inducing potential transactors to behave so as to maximize
88

While the concept of utility is surely not exhausted by material, economic
welfare, and can encompass social and relational goods, our nomenclature follows
the conventional focus on contract’s material benefits. This is also why we use the
terms utility and efficiency interchangeably.
89
See DAGAN, supra note 87, at ch.5. It is beyond the scope of this Article
to detail how values external to contracting may affect or have affected contract
law. For an important discussion of one such value – distributive justice – see
Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and
Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991).
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aggregate social welfare, where welfare is conventionally defined as
preference satisfaction.90
This understanding has much pragmatic
strength, but always brings with it an uneasiness regarding the moral status
of aggregate utility in contract theory. The moral concerns are familiar:
some challenge framing the public good in terms of aggregate preference
satisfaction; others question the legitimacy of using private law for such
collectivist purposes.91
We need not resolve this controversy. Within the domain of
contract law, many of the lessons of economic analysis are consistent with
a commitment to autonomy as contract law’s ultimate value. The reason
is straightforward, at least from the point of view of our account of
contractual autonomy. Often, maximizing the joint surplus is the good, or
at least a good, of the contracting parties themselves. For such contracts,
respect for autonomy entails embrace of economic analysis. Insofar as the
efficient reallocation of their respective entitlements is what the parties
want, and if (but only if) this good does not undermine the ultimate
normative commitment to autonomy, then these theories converge: to
respect autonomy, look to efficiency as the measure of ideal law in that
type of contracting. (We reserve discussion of values in conflict and of
how our account differs from economic analysis to Part III, below).
2. An application to business contracts. To demonstrate the
potential usefulness and limits of the economic analysis of contract law to
an autonomy-based theory, consider Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott’s
work on business contracts, that is, contracts between firms.92 Their
central organizing question is, “What contract law would commercial
parties want the state to provide?”93 Their answer is that such law “should
90

See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 307 (6th ed.
2011) (the economic theory of contracts begins with the proposition that
“[c]ooperation is productive,” and thus “creates value” and concludes that law
ideally should “induce[] optimal performance and reliance at low transaction
costs.”). See also, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 123 (8th
ed. 2011). Critics of this scholarship also characterize the work this way. See,
e.g., SMITH, supra note 3, at 108; Benson, supra note 1, at 54-60.
91
See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra note 36, at 297-333.
92
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 545 (2003) (defining the firm).
93
Id. at 549.
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restrict itself to the pursuit of efficiency alone.”94 They assume there are
no relevant externalities (or rather that such externalities should be
specifically targeted by, for example, environmental and antitrust laws)
and set aside concerns of systematic cognitive error.95
For this
(externality-free, bias-free, sophisticated-commercial) subset of the
contractual universe, Schwartz and Scott sensibly identify the good of
contracting as maximizing the parties’ joint gains, or the contractual
surplus.96 Given this good, they argue provocatively that much of current
business contract law is misguided and should be modified so parties can
more easily generate a larger contractual surplus.97
Does this approach fully displace autonomy as contract’s ultimate
value, even within their sharply constrained sphere of business contracts?98
It does not, as a close reading of Schwartz and Scott shows. They do
assert that business firms are “artificial persons whose autonomy the state
need not respect.”99 And they do claim that welfare maximization should
solely guide this contracting sphere.100 But why privilege utility? For
them, it’s out of deference to the contracting parties – because of concern
for “party sovereignty,” a term they emphasize and repeatedly use.101
94

Id. at 545.
Id. at 545-46.
96
See id. at 544.
97
Schwartz and Scott thus recommend: (1) reversing some mandatory
rules, id. at 619; (2) adopting the disfavored textualist approach as the default
theory of interpretation, see id. at 568-94; see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E.
Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926 (2010); and, (3)
significantly limiting the domain of state-supplied defaults, see Schwartz &
Scott, supra note 92, at 594-609. They note, however, two business contract
settings where legal facilitation is crucial. Id. at 544; see also infra text
accompanying note 157 (discussing these settings).
98
We admit that there may be other possible readings of their framing of
the role of efficiency in business settings. Thus, in their response to critics, they
emphasize other reasons to adopt efficiency above all. See Schwartz & Scott,
supra note 97, at 934-35. Deference to “the parties’ objective ex ante
intentions,” though, is mentioned as the premise of “The Case for Party Control.”
Id. at 939.
99
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 92, at 556.
100
See id. at 544.
101
“Party sovereignty” is mentioned twice, for example, in the short
conclusion of their piece. See id. at 618-19.
95
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Their account (along with many other similar ones102) seems to stand for
the following proposition: given the welfare-maximizing goals typical of
the anticipated parties in business contracts, “party sovereignty” requires
that the law governing such transactions follow suit.103 But behind the
“artificial persons” making business contracts stand real people, and it is
the choices those real people are seeking to make that the law ultimately
serves. Framed this way, “party sovereignty” devolves to contractual
autonomy as we define it – it’s a concern best understood as autonomyregarding, not utility-maximizing.
We acknowledge that the significance of party sovereignty can
also be grounded in epistemological reasons – in which parties are
perceived as carriers of the best information regarding their preferences –
so that respecting their choices is just a means for reaching the ultimate
goal of aggregate welfare. But we believe that our interpretation of party
sovereignty is more productive for economic analysis of contract law,
because it allows legal economists to accommodate their collectivist
welfare-maximizing methodology within an individualist, autonomyregarding normative framework to which they are typically (if implicitly)
committed. This interpretation is, in any case, the reason why its findings
should matter to autonomy-minded contract theorists.
In our theory, autonomy and utility sit easily beside each other.
When people choose to come together in their commercial lives, and to the
extent they are then seeking wealth maximization, contract law should
facilitate that choice. Thus, autonomy requires that contract law offer
various structures for business arrangements – a rich array of corporate,
partnership, trust, and commercial contract forms. With the autonomy
imperative satisfied, the inner life of these contract types should facilitate
people’s welfare goals, to the extent that is what people are seeking.
Contract law between such firms, then, should maximize joint surplus, per
Schwartz and Scott. This is not because autonomy is irrelevant, but
because the concept has already done its work at an earlier stage.
102

See, e.g., VICTOR GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 2 (2006). Interestingly, this may also be the (or a) way
to read STEVEN M. SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
296-99 (2004).
103
See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 92, at 556.

[9/12/2013 Draft]

FREEDOM OF CONTRACTS

25

3. The limits of the business contracts example. There is another
lesson we can take from Schwartz and Scott’s careful delimitation of their
study. Their sharp focus on business contracts helps “set[] out the
theoretical foundations of a law merchant for our time.”104 This is an
important task. But it cannot be the basis for a general theory of contract
law. Even Schwartz and Scott acknowledge that rules applicable to
externality-free, bias-free, and sophisticated-commercial parties may not
be suitable for other types of contracts, particularly those involving
individuals.105 As we move away from their corner case, efficiency
analysis remains pertinent – because people so often seek material benefits
when they contract – but “party sovereignty” no longer straightforwardly
points to maximizing joint economic surplus. Efficiency analysis does not
become irrelevant, but its role is necessarily diminished as competing
values play a larger role.
Legal economic theorists of contract typically struggle when faced
with such incommensurable values.106 They respond usually through one
of two flawed strategies. The first, and least convincing approach, is to
deny the conflict and instead assert that efficiency analysis can ground
normative analysis of contract law as a whole. When such theorists try to
explain areas of contracting that are widely understood to be animated by
quite different values – such as family contracts – the results are
disappointing.
The second, inverse approach re-defines and shrinks what
constitutes the field of contract law. Thus, for Schwartz and Scott
contracts between firms are “the main subject of what is commonly called
contract law,” because other types of contract are governed by other rules,
outside of “Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and the
provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.” As they put it,
contracts “between individuals are primarily regulated by family law
(antenuptial agreements and divorce settlements) and real property law
(home sales and some leases)”; contracts “between a firm as seller and an
104

Id. at 550.
Id.
106
See generally Alon Harel & Ariel Porat, Commensurability and Agency:
Two Yet-to-Be-Met Challenges for Law and Economics, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
749, 751-67 (2011).
105
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individual as buyer are primarily regulated by consumer protection law,
real property law (most leases), and the securities laws”; and contracts
“between an individual as seller and a firm as buyer, commonly involve
the sale of a person’s labor, are regulated by laws governing the
employment relation.”107
Radically shrinking the scope of contract law is no more appealing
than over-extending economic analysis.
Schwartz and Scott’s
observations may reflect the canonical division of labor of contemporary
contract laws and of the focus of most first-year courses in contract law.
But labels and syllabi do not define the field of state enforcement of
voluntary obligations. Calling business contracts the core does not make it
so. We do not get closer to a general theory of contract by excluding the
vast bulk of contracting which occurs in the spheres of family, home,
consumer transactions, and employment. Focusing on business contracts
has advantages we’ve already noted, but the focus is misleading for the
rest of contract theory. Schwartz and Scott may have identified the one
sphere of contracting in which utility and autonomy concerns seem to
converge. Everywhere else, they don’t. Their example both ignores the
other goods of contracting and obscures at least part of potential of
contract as a – maybe the – legal means for enhancing our autonomy.
B. Community
1. The value of community. People contract not just for economic
benefits, but also for the social gains that come from working together,
from taking part in a successful collective enterprise.108 Cooperation, in
other words, is at times a good of contracting, in and of itself, in addition
to its importance in facilitating economic success. People value
interpersonal relationships – not only for instrumental reasons, as a means
to some independently specified end.109 Contract may help in furthering
these intrinsically valuable relationships, and thus provide people an
107

Id. at 544.
Raz addresses this good of contract in mentioning the special bonds or
relations that contract creates. See supra text accompanying note 80.
109
See Samuel Scheffler, Relationships and Responsibilities, 26 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 189, 200 (1997).
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opportunity to enrich and solidify the interpersonal capital that grows from
cooperation, support, trust, and mutual responsibility.
Community-based (or relational) theories of contract bring these
interpersonal goods to the fore. These theories begin with a complaint
against traditional theories that, for them, are excessively individualistic
and miss the essence of contract. Instead, they premise contract on the
interpersonal relations it creates.110 At times, these theories become as
over-extended as the theories they criticize. To say that all contracts are
necessarily relational, and that community is the core of contracting,
requires marginalizing large swaths of contracting from analysis – it gives
results as implausible as those from over-expanding efficiency analysis.
While the extreme version of community-based theory is not
useful, a more nuanced reading can enrich our autonomy-based theory.
Contract law should support individual freedom to form various types of
communities, just as it should further efficient allocation, when that is what
the contracting parties seek. Community-based values, like their economic
counterparts, are necessary building blocks of a general liberal theory of
contract.
2. Community, thick and thin. Community-based theories can be
divided roughly into two groups, what we call thick and thin accounts. Ian
Macneil best represents the former camp and is the scholar most associated
with the relational understanding of contract. He has argued that much, if
not most, contract practice does not comply with the model of a simple
exchange of goods.111 Varied contract types – in marriage, labor and
employment, franchising, and other long-term transactions involving assetspecific investments – differ fundamentally from such discrete contracting.
Since these long-term contracts are “characterized by complex (ex ante
unspecifiable) obligations and asset specific (ex post noncompensable)
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See Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417,
1419-21 (2004). See also David Campbell, Ian Macneil and the Relational
Theory of Contract, in THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED
WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL 3, 5, 9-10, 14 (David Campbell ed., 2001).
111
See, e.g., Ian Macneil, Relational Contracts: What We Do and Do Not
Know, in RELATIONAL THEORY, supra note 110, at 257, 261.
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investments,” they require the parties to “adopt a consciously co-operative
attitude.”112
Another typical feature of relational contracts is the significance of
what may be called “contract governance.” Although planning the substance
of the exchange is still important, “many specific substantive courses of
action cannot be planned in advance.”113 Thus, Macneil points out, more
emphasis must be placed on the “operating relations” of the parties and on
“structures and processes.”114 While, at times, much of this governance
structure is formal and even hierarchical, these contracts necessarily rely also
on some measure of trust and solidarity.115 And in some types of such
contracts, the parties “engage in social exchange [and not only in] economic
exchange,” or at least become highly interdependent, so that their “relations
tend to include both sharp divisions of benefits and burdens and a sharing of
them.”116
Compare this thick account of contractual communities to Daniel
Markovits’ theory of contract as the epitome of “respectful communities”
premised on “the collaborative ideal.”117 This “thin” notion of community
is sharply limited: it aims to explain the morality of promise among selfinterested strangers.118 Contracts, like other types of promises, establish for
Markovits “a relation of recognition and respect – and indeed a kind of
community – among those who participate in them,” and it is “the value of
this relation” that explains and justifies the morality of promise and the
legitimacy of contract law.119 This “collaborative” model of contract does
112

Campbell, supra note 110, at 16, 22. See also, e.g., Ian Macneil,
Exchange Revisited: Individual Utility and Social Solidarity, 96 ETHICS 567,
578-79 (1986).
113
Ian Macneil, The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern
Contractual Relations, in RELATIONAL THEORY, supra note 110, at 144.
114
Id.
115
See id. at 143, 151.
116
Id. at 136, 146, 148. See also Ian Macneil, Restatement (Second) of
Contracts and Presentation, 60 VA. L. REV. 589, 595 (1974) (claiming that “[t]he
entangling strings of friendship, reputation, interdependence, morality and
altruistic desires are integral parts of the relation”).
117
Markovits, supra note 110.
118
Id. at 1420.
119
Id.
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not imply any “concern for other persons’ interests,” but rather “a concern
for other persons’ intentions and, ultimately, for their points of view.”120
Thus, it applies precisely to arm’s length contracts between individuals121;
not to the thicker, more contextual relations that concern Macneil,122 nor to
contracts involving organizations.123
Markovits claims that, “as a descriptive matter, contracts among
individual persons – governed by the doctrines of traditional contract law
– play a fairly prominent role in many individual persons’ moral and legal
lives.”124 More strongly, Markovits asserts that contracts between
strangers “represent the core of contract,”125 and that excluding Macneil’s
relational contracts and Schwartz and Scott’s business contracts does not
“undermine the collaborative view’s claim to capture the essence of
contract.”126 What is that essence? For Markovits, “[c]ontract law’s
primary purpose” is “to sustain collaborative agreements among
individual persons.”127
3. The limits of community-based theories. We disagree with
Markovits’ and Macneil’s claims to capture the conceptual core of
contract, just as we disagreed above with Schwartz and Scott. There is no
more justification for elevating contracts between individuals than there is
to privileging contracts between businesses. (And, as an aside, both these
approaches have a blind spot for contracts between individuals and
organizations, in particular consumer transactions, which play such a large
role in modern life). All these approaches try to craft a general theory of
contract from too-limited examples. And yet, notwithstanding the
excesses of community-based theory, we find value in these accounts. For
example, the decision whether to use a franchise or commercial agency
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Id. at 1450-51.
Id. at 1462.
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Id. at 1450, 1462.
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Id. at 1464-66.
124
Id. at 1471-72.
125
Id. at 1421; see also id. at 1450, 1465 (reiterating this point); Daniel
Markovits, Promise as an Arm’s-length Relation, in PROMISES AND
AGREEMENTS: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 295 (Hanoch Sheinman ed., 2011).
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Markovits, supra note 110, at 1467.
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Id. at 1472.
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contract can be understood, in part, as a choice between creating thin and
thick contractual communities.128
Markovits’ collaborative ideal is indeed a good descriptive fit for
the contract types on which he focuses, and it captures one normatively
attractive vision of the relationship that contract law can help establish. In
some “contracts involving the purchase and sale of personal property,”
and even more so “of services in many forms, including childcare and
elder care, day labor, and services associated with any number of trades
and professions,”129 contract can serve as a “means by which people can
“overcom[e] isolation through an intentional pursuit of shared ends,”
enabling them “to cease to be strangers,” by “enter[ing] into respectful
relations with each other.”130 But this is not the only interpersonal ideal
autonomous people can legitimately pursue.131 Sometimes people seek,
and contract law can help provide, the thick communitarian ideal of
contractual community envisioned by Macneil. And sometimes people
want what we call the “no community” ideal on which many other
contracts rely.132
An autonomy-based contract law should facilitate all three
alternatives (thick, thin, and no-community) and allow people to choose
from among these ideals as they shape different spheres of their lives.
Accordingly, contract theory should both embrace autonomy as contract’s
ultimate value and respect the diverse, sometimes conflicting, substantive
goods, material and interpersonal, that people seek from contracting.
128

A franchise is thinner than a comparable commercial agency contract,
because of the fiduciary duties that typify the latter, the agent’s capacity to bind
the principal, and the potential for respondeat superior liability.
See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (2006), §§ 1.01 (fiduciary relationship),
2.01–2.02 (scope of agent’s authority), and 2.04, 7.08 (scope of respondeat
superior liability).
129
Id.
130
Id. at 1434-35, 1440-41.
131
We do not deny Markovits’ claim that the contract form implies
recognition of the other party’s intention and point of view; but because this is a
very thin requirement, which entails neither respect nor community, such
recognition may be purely instrumental.
132
See our discussion of consumer contracts, infra text accompanying notes
154-156 and 175-177.
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III. A LIBERAL AND GENERAL THEORY OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACTS

With these building blocks identified, we can now set out a liberal
and general theory of contract law. There are four ways that our approach
diverges from prior theories, keyed to the four sections in this Part: (a)
We offer a liberal view of contractual autonomy focusing on freedom of
contracts, that is, parties’ ability to choose from among attractive contract
types. This robust contract law can increase human freedom, a claim that
may seem paradoxical, but is not. (b) We offer a general theory with a
conceptually-coherent account of the goods of contracting and their
interrelationships. There is no single animating principle that captures the
quintessence of all contracting practice. (c) On the descriptive level, we
develop a taxonomy that identifies the distinctive subject matter and
recurring dilemmas of each contractual sphere and bridges between
contract law and theory. (d) Finally, at the normative level, we argue that,
to enhance freedom in each sphere, contract law must offer a rich menu of
types with distinct value balances. Just piggybacking on the will of the
parties does not reflect contract law as it is, nor as it should be.
A. How Contract Law Increases Human Freedom
1. The centrality of choice and multiplicity. The key to
understanding contractual autonomy is to see it, as we concluded in Part I
above, as a good that needs to be fostered. Here, we make the view
explicit and more precise by adapting Raz’s conception of personal
autonomy as self-authorship. While his work resonates in political
philosophy, it can also help ground an attractively-liberal view of freedom
in contract law. In particular, we can take two useful points from Raz:133

133

A thorough exegesis of Raz’s “perfectionist liberalism” is beyond the
scope of this Article. However, it may still be worthwhile to flag that our
interpretation of his work is different from Martha Nussbaum’s and similar to
Alan Brudner’s. See respectively Martha C. Nussbaum, Perfectionist Liberalism
and Political Liberalism, 39 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (2011); ALAN BRUDNER,
CONSTITUTIONAL GOODS 25 (2004).
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(1) to be free, individuals need meaningful choice, and (2) states have a
necessary role in supporting valuable options.134
On the first point, freedom requires that individuals be able to
choose from among options they deem valuable. The idea of autonomy –
that people should, to some degree, be the authors of their own lives –
requires not only appropriate mental abilities and independence, but also
“an adequate range of options.”135 For choice to be effective, for
autonomy to be meaningful, there must be (other things being equal)
“more valuable options than can be chosen, and they must be significantly
different,” so that choices involve “tradeoffs, which require relinquishing
one good for the sake of another.”136
Thus, autonomy emphasizes “the value of a large number of
greatly differing pursuits among which individuals are free to choose.”137
In turn, a society that pursues this autonomy ideal must ensure that there
exists a wide range of social forms that “leave enough room for individual
choice.”138 Autonomy contract theorists, including Raz,139 missed the
significance of this obligation to a liberal account of contracting, maybe
because they constricted their view of contract down to the symmetrical
and discrete arm’s length exchange. While that form is one important type
of voluntary obligation, it is not an adequate stand-in for contract as a
whole. If one takes autonomy seriously, then contract theory must
celebrate the multiple spheres of contract law rather than suppress them
(as variations on a common theme) or marginalize them (as peripheral
exceptions to a robust core).
No less significant to choice, and thus to autonomy, is contract
law’s intra-sphere multiplicity. Within each sphere, a liberal contract law
134

Doubts as to the necessity of state action in promoting autonomyenhancing conditions give rise to the most significant critique of perfectionist
liberalism: as a form of paternalism. See JONATHAN QUONG, LIBERALISM
WITHOUT PERFECTION 85-96 (2011). Our discussion in Part III.A.2-3 below
demonstrates that whatever the power of this critique may be regarding other
implications of Raz’s account of autonomy, it is inapplicable to ours.
135
See RAZ, supra note 75, at 372.
136
Id. at 398.
137
Id. at 381, 399.
138
Id. at 395.
139
See supra Section I.D.2.
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must include sufficiently distinct contract types for the diverse social
settings and economic functions in which law helps people undertake
voluntary obligations. Only such a rich repertoire can enable people to
freely choose their own ends, principles, forms of life, and associations.
Consider a few examples where our theory counsels for more choice than
the law currently offers:
(a) Employment types. First, people should be able to choose
whether to work as independent contractors or as employees (or to use
other contract types).
We recognize that classifying the parties’
relationships as employer/employee or employer/independent contractor is
now considered a question of law, so the parties’ characterization of the
relationship is not controlling.140 Formally, the law refers to a long list of
non-exhaustive criteria, which seems to imply significant ad hoc discretion
ex post, and thus to preclude, or at least impede, the parties’ ex ante
planning.141 But it turns out that the law in action is sufficiently
predictable that careful parties can fashion their arrangement so that it will
likely be classified per their mutually desired type.142 In our view, that
freedom to choose should be simplified and formalized, so that it becomes
meaningfully available and not just to well-counseled parties.
(b) Purchases of Consumer Goods. As a second example, our
approach suggests that people should, in some circumstances, be able to
choose between purchasing a good with the protections of consumer
transaction law or in an arm’s length traditional sale. We recognize that
140

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 cmt. b (T.D.
No. 2 Rev., 2009).
141
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958); see also
Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One
and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295 (2001).
142
See Teresa J. Webb et al., An Empirical Assist in Resolving the
Classification Dilemma of Workers as Either Employees or Independent
Contractors, 24 J. APPLIED BUS. RES. 45 (2008) (deducing three dominant
criteria: employer control, integration or services, and payment of assistants);
see, e.g., Robert W. Wood, Do’s and Don’ts When Using Independent
Contractors, BUSINESS LAW TODAY (June 16, 2011) available at
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/ content/2011/06/article-wood.shtml; U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, Tips for Using Independent Contractors, available at
http://www.uschambersmallbusiness nation.com/toolkits/guide/P05_0092.
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consumer protection doctrine applies at least to merchant/consumer
transactions,143 while sales law applies only to non-merchant sellers (i.e.,
amateurs) and to commercial transactions (i.e. those between businesses).
Insofar as this division derives from public policy concerns – involving
possible collective action problems that waivability may trigger144 – we
have no objection.145 But wherever no such external effects apply, sellers
and buyers of consumer goods should have an alternative route, so that the
availability of the consumer contract type would indeed add options,
rather than just reconfigure an existing one. We thus support the
allowance made by Texas for written and signed waivers by wellcounseled individuals who are “not in a significantly disparate bargaining
position.”146 Similarly, we support the Massachusetts rule that business
purchasers, which come within the protection of that state’s consumer law,
may waive their rights even though an individual purchaser could not.147
We could multiply the examples – consider cohabitation, civil
unions, and covenant marriage as alternative types to conventional
marriage148 – but we have made the point: diversity of contract types is a
necessary, although by no means sufficient, condition for contractual
autonomy. In addition, we must be alert to opportunities for expanding
choice, such as the Texas and Massachusetts provisions noted above.
143

That is, it applies where a seller who “regularly solicits, engages in, or
enforces consumer transactions” deals with a buyer purchasing for “personal,
family, or household” purposes. UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT §
2(1), (5), 7A U.L.A. 69 (2002). Consumers, typically, cannot opt out of these
protections. See CAROLYN L. CARTER & JONATHAN SHELDON, UNFAIR AND
DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES § 4.2.19.4, at 257-61 (8th ed. 2012); DEE
PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW §
5:21 (2012 ed.).
144
See Gisela Rühl, Consumer Protection in Choice of Law, 44 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 569, 571-75 (2011).
145
Recall our recognition of possible normative concerns external to the
bilateral parties, supra text accompanying note 89.
146
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42(a) (West 2011).
147
Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 548 N.E.2d 182, 187
(Mass. 1990).
148
For a conceptualization of cohabitation along these lines, see Shahar
Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation of Spousal
Relationship, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1569 (2009).
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Whereas previous theories correctly focused on freedom within a
particular contract, they have missed the role of freedom across contract
types.
2. The liberal obligation to provide diverse contract law. Raz’s
account of contract, like the account of other autonomy-based contract
theorists, also missed the generative role of law in offering choices.149 But
a new take on his rightly celebrated Morality of Freedom can help remedy
this flaw and highlight the crucial role of law for contract. As Raz argues,
given the diversity of human goods from which autonomous people should
be able to choose and their distinct constitutive values, the state must
recognize a sufficiently diverse set of robust frameworks for people to
organize their lives.150 But the state’s obligation to foster diversity and
multiplicity cannot be properly accomplished through a hands-off attitude
by the law because such an attitude “would undermine the chances of
survival of many cherished aspects of our culture.”151 A commitment to
personal autonomy thus requires a liberal state, through its laws, more
actively to “enable individuals to pursue valid conceptions of the good” by
providing a multiplicity of options.152
This important obligation is relevant to contract law. As Stephen
Smith notes, contract law plays a crucial role in the practice of
undertaking voluntary obligations by expanding “the range of options
available to individuals” and thus increasing “the possibility of
autonomous action.” And while it is difficult to define “what constitutes
an ‘adequate range of options,’” it seems plausible that “the range of
options that exist in a society without contract law will sometimes be
inadequate” and that “contract law makes available options that would
otherwise be unavailable.”153
To be more concrete, deals with strangers – what we call nocommunity contracts154 – are an important category of options that
contract law makes available. Dori Kimel even puts such deals at the core
149
150
151
152
153
154

See supra Section I.D.2.
See RAZ, supra note 75, at 265.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 133, 265.
SMITH, supra note 3, at 139-40.
See supra text accompanying note 132.
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of contract law. While we reject his (and any other) essentializing
strategy, we agree these deals are a big category worthy of attention.
Kimel argues that the intrinsic value of contracts lies in “the value of
personal detachment,” that is, of “doing certain things with others” both
“outside the context of already-existing relationships” and “without a
commitment to the future prospect of such relationships.”155 Though
overstated, Kimel’s focus on detachment helpfully demonstrates the
requirement of active legal support of contracts. Law is crucial for the
very possibility of consumer transactions – the paradigmatic contract type
which responds, in our view, to Kimel’s account of detachment-based,
autonomy-enhancing contracts.156
Beyond enabling consumer transactions (a significant subset of the
anonymous side of contracting), law is crucial in supporting contracts
even in the business contracts context. As Schwartz and Scott observe,
legal facilitation is indispensable for commercial contracts in two nontrivial types of cases: “in volatile markets, when a party’s failure to
perform could threaten its contract partner’s survival; and when
contractual surplus would be maximized if one or both parties made
relation-specific investments.”157 Active contract law is no less significant
in relational contracts as well where it helps facilitate trust-based
interpersonal relationships. Though moral commitment, social norms, and
reputational concerns drive much party behavior, a hands-off policy and a
minimalist (libertarian) attitude to freedom of contract can hardly suffice
to overcome endemic difficulties to long-term cooperation.
Various impediments to contract are pervasive in all these settings
– information costs (symmetric and asymmetric), cognitive biases,
bilateral monopolies, heightened risks of opportunistic behavior, and other
transactions costs (in the broad sense).158 Merely enforcing the parties’
155

KIMEL, supra note 69, at 78, see also id. at 79.
Our reference to “law” in general is not coincidental. While we argue
that contract law can play a significant role in making consumer transactions a
viable autonomy-enhancing alternative, we acknowledge that other bodies of
law, which are regulatory in nature, are also important for this task.
157
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 97, at 544.
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See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
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expressed intentions would not be sufficient to overcome the inherent risks
of such endeavors. Contract laws provide the background reassurances
that help catalyze the trust so crucial for success.159 Even where law is
rarely invoked, its active engagement is likely to be the sine qua non that
makes viable these challenging types of interpersonal relationships.
In sum, across a range of contracting spheres law must actively
engage the liberal commitment to contractual autonomy.
The
impediments to secure contracting often depend on the specific features of
the contract type at hand and therefore each type requires its own legal
facilitation. People can, by and large, further customize their contracts to
their particular needs and circumstances. But in most cases these
refinements build on an off-the-shelf, legal edifice that already addresses
many of the difficulties they might otherwise have to face. Thus, many
valuable forms of interpersonal interaction only become available thanks
to the active support of law. Before applying their freedom within a
particular contract, people need to rely on law’s support for freedom
across contract types.
3. Contract and culture. Thus far we have discussed how the
diverse contract types that law facilitates help to overcome various
bargaining obstacles. But alongside this material effect, law’s inventory
of contract types affects our contracting practices in an even more
profound, albeit more subtle, fashion. To appreciate this effect, consider
the difficulties facing parties who seek to shape their contract as, say, one
of bailment, suretyship, or fiduciary in an environment in which these
notions have not been coined. Setting up terms that would duplicate our
conventional design of these contract types is surely complex, so
transaction costs along the lines discussed earlier would inhibit such
contracts in many cases. But this material aspect does not fully capture
the difficulty such parties face. For us, the concepts of bailee, surety, or
fiduciary have core conventional meanings that make them culturally
available as possible modes of contracting. Without such salient

Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051
(2000).
159
See supra Section I.C.2.
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meanings, which are by and large legally constructed, these parties may
not even reach the stage of confronting bargaining obstacles, because they
may face a preliminary impediment, an obstacle of the imagination.
By contrast, once the “character” of a contract type or its raison
d’être gains broad social and cultural recognition, most people (roughly)
know what they are getting into when they, for example, engage a surety,
buy insurance, enter consumer transaction, lease an apartment, or start a
new job.160 In this way, the salient categories contract law employs also
affect people’s preferences respecting constitutive categories of
relationships.161 Old-fashioned “freedom of contract” does not fulfill
these roles. Freedom to tailor-make terms, while important, does not
consolidate expectations or express shared normative ideals regarding our
basic categories of interpersonal relationships. Consider two examples.
(a) Suretyship. Suretyship is a complex contract type, the subject
matter of a full-blown Restatement,162 an obvious product of legal
construction distinct from, say, a fiduciary or bailee.163 But the concept of
a surety, who undertakes an obligation to substitute another’s duty to pay
(or perform) if that other person fails to do so,164 is widely recognized.
Many people (vaguely, to be sure) know what it means; at times they even
know some of its basic rules, such as the right of a surety who was

160

See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 766, 788 (1995) (discussing the accumulated
outcome of the social learning effect and the network externalities phenomenon).
The correspondence between contract law and its popular understanding is far
from being perfect. Oftentimes, gaps relate to details and thus do not pose a real
challenge to our claim; but there are admittedly cases where these gaps go to
some core features of a contract type. See infra note 269.
161
Cf. Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and
Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1758-59 (1997).
162
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP & GUARANTY (1996).
163
Suretyships are tripartite agreements where a secondary contract is
conditional on a benefit for and a failure in the principal contract and in which
the surety obtains no direct benefit from the arrangement. See 72 C.J.S.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY § 12 (Mar. 2013).
164
See, e.g., Frank S. H. Bae & Marian E. McGrath, The Rights of a Surety
(Or Secondary Obligor) Under the Restatement of the Law, Third, Suretyship
and Guaranty, 122 BANKING L.J. 783, 787-89 (2005).
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required to pay or perform to recover from the primary obligor.165 They
can thus invoke this contract type as a means for facilitating transactions
that would have been too risky otherwise because the primary obligor’s
ability to perform is in doubt.166 Indeed, exactly because contract types –
like our private law categories more generally – tend to blend into our
natural environment, they help structure our daily interactions.167
(b) Insurance. As with surety contracts, insurance contracts
comprise a thick layer of rules that correspond (perhaps imperfectly) to the
ideal party relationships they anticipate. They thus participate in the ongoing social production of stable categories of human interaction by
consolidating people’s expectations of themselves and others. Consider
some of the distinctive features of insurance contract law: the frequent,
traditional use of the contra proferentem rule against insurers,168 the
“reasonable expectations” doctrine (in some jurisdictions),169 and the
emerging doctrine of insurer bad faith.170 These rules are not defects in
the “general” law, but are instead tools that reflect, and help further
inculcate, widely-shared understandings of ideal insurance relationships.
We concede contract law cannot possibly serve this expressive and
cultural role as to every idiosyncratic arrangement that parties may pursue.
But it can, should, and to some extent does perform this function
respecting a limited number of core categories of such arrangements.
“Freedom of contracts” stands for contract law’s participation in the
cultural production of diverse contract types among which people may
165

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 22(1)(A)

(1996).
166

See THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 3:4 (June 2012).
See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical
Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 195, 212-14 (1987).
168
See, e.g., ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 628
(1988).
169
Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, Why Courts Enforce
Insurance Policyholders’ Objectively Reasonable Expectations of Insurance
Coverage, 5 CONN. INSUR. L.J. 455 (1998).
170
See James M. Fischer, Should Advice of Counsel Constitute a Defense
for Insurer Bad Faith?, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1447, 1451 (1994) (noting that doctrine
covers misconduct which results in the delayed receipt of policy proceeds by the
insured).
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choose. This inventory offers people choices they might not bargain for if
they were defaulted into the prototypical arm’s length commercial
contract.171 (Consider, by contrast to the saliency of suretyship, the
“cultural invisibility” of the possibility of job-sharing, which is exactly
why we will invoke this category as one possible “missing contract type”
that we recommend adding.172) Ensuring sufficient diversity of valuable
contract types is a core feature, benefit, and indeed obligation of a contract
law regime committed to human freedom.
B. How Contract Values Relate
A legal theory that relies on multiple values must address how they
interrelate. Because the values we invoke – autonomy, efficiency, and
community – are oftentimes treated as rivals, our theory carries a heavy
burden in this arena. The task of this Section is to show that our freedom
of contracts approach dissipates some of these apparent conflicts and
provides important guidelines to the resolution of the others.
The key to this challenge is to assign each value its proper role.
Autonomy, we argue, is contract’s ultimate value and the source of the
state’s obligation to provide meaningful diversity of contract types. But
because autonomy is never the reason for making a contract, it cannot be
its sole value. Utility and community are contract’s instrumental values.
Community may even be intrinsically valuable to the extent it is
constitutive of the autonomy-enhancing potential of certain contract
types.173
1. Horizontal coexistence. Sometimes contract’s potential goods
are in conflict. What then? Contract law cannot always help people
obtain all these competing goods. While utility and community are often
mutually-reinforcing,174 at times they push in different directions. But it is
171

See Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 8 (2006) (arguing
that even “statutory menus that merely reiterate what the private parties could
have done contractually by other means can have a big effect”).
172
See infra text accompanying note 268.
173
On this distinction between ultimate, intrinsic, and instrumental values, see
RAZ, supra note 75, at 177-78.
174
See Philip Pettit, The Cunning of Trust, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 202, 209-
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not the job of autonomy-friendly contract law to decide which of these
values trumps or how they should be balanced. Rather, contract law
should support multiple contract types, each of which offers a distinct
balance of goods, so that parties can choose their own favorite balance.
Situating utility and community under autonomy’s rule helps
explain where previous totalizing contract theories have gone astray. At
times, people may prefer not to obtain certain goods that other times seem
fundamental. Consider the good of community. Macneil is right to
highlight the prevalence and significance of diverse relational contracts in
which interpersonal cooperation is of the essence. But there are equally
important contracting spheres for which the communitarian goods he
celebrates are beside the point, at least for most parties. Consider the thin
communities Markovits discusses or the inter-organizational contracts
Schwartz and Scott address.
More pointedly, consider a consumer transaction for a relatively
inexpensive good or service primarily intended for personal use. In that
significant sphere of contracting, the consumer is (typically) uninterested
in personal relations with the merchant. Indeed, autonomy is enhanced
insofar as law helps people make such transactions quickly, anonymously,
and securely so they can focus their time and attention instead on more
valuable projects.175 This no-community commitment can explain and
justify some of the most conspicuous features of consumer contract law,176
10 (1995).
175
This reconceptualization of consumer transactions, which emerges from
our discussion of Kimel’s account of contracts, supra text accompanying notes
155-156, was to some extent anticipated by Karl Llewellyn. See Robert A.
Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic
Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 455 (2002).
176
Our account of consumer contracts is admittedly ahistorical: this type
largely resulted from paternalistic regulation that limited classical freedom of
contract. See Fred H. Miller, Consumers and the Code: The Search for the
Proper Formula, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 187, 187-99 (1997); see generally Anthony
T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983).
Nonetheless, this contract type enhances freedom of contracts because it likely
expands buyer autonomy more than it reduces autonomy for sellers (which are
typically organizations with no claim to autonomy, see infra text accompanying
note 189). But because of its autonomy-reducing effect, we argue that law
should also make available alternative types in settings where consumer
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such as imposing on businesses heightened duties of disclosure and
affording consumers certain rights to cancellation and warranty, which all
go far beyond the protective measures anticipated by “classical” contract
law.177
Relational contracts, business contracts, consumer contracts – all
support equally fundamental types of human activity; yet each responds to
different values autonomous people may seek. This means that the proper
place for utility and community is not at the level of animating contract
law as a whole. Rather, they are components of distinct contract types that
support people’s diverse pursuits and interests, whether interpersonal
relationships, the maximization of their joint material surplus, or the many
permutations between these poles. Only a sufficiently rich repertoire of
contract types properly facilitates people’s ability to choose and revise
their various endeavors and interpersonal interactions.
2. Vertical implications. If contract law is to live up to its promise
of enhancing autonomy, it must facilitate people’s ability to pursue the
utilitarian and communitarian goods that contracts can bring about. So our
division of labor does not imply that utility and community are
unimportant to contract. If much of the value of contract comes from
freedom to choose among types, and if the most important values that
should shape these types are utility and community, then these values are
nothing short of crucial to contract law.
And yet we argued that the value of utility and community in
contract is neither fundamental nor freestanding, but rather derives from
the way that they serve the parties’ autonomous pursuit of their goals.
Here we identify two implications of our claim that autonomy is contract’s

transactions do not impose costly external effects. See supra text accompanying
notes 143-147. Making an alternative available means that consumer contracts
add an option, rather than just limiting an existing one.
177
See respectively OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2012); Omri BenShahar & Eric A. Posner, The Right to Withdraw in Contract Law, 40 J. LEGAL
STUD. 115 (2011); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in
Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests,
69 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1983).
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ultimate value, while utility and community are the goods an autonomybased contract law can help secure.
(a) Voluntariness as common denominator. Freedom of contracts’
ultimate commitment to self-authorship implies that law should be
responsible for “creating the conditions for autonomous life, primarily by
guaranteeing that an adequate range of diverse and valuable options shall be
available to all.”178 But because autonomy is emphatically “incompatible
with any vision of morality being thrust down people’s throats,” it must
stop there and “leave individuals free to make their lives what they will.”179
This premise implies that contract is – and should remain – a voluntary
obligation. People may not be forcibly pushed to seek contract’s potential
efficiency or community goods.
This proposition of voluntariness, which underlies the liberal
commitment to “freedom from contract,”180 constitutes the common
denominator of the otherwise heterogeneous realm of contract law. There
are, to be sure, diverse doctrinal means to ensure voluntariness: in addition
to doctrines like offer and acceptance and duress, think about the familiar
common law resort to formalities like consideration or writing181 or about
the civil law requirement of intent-to-contract.182 So, different liberal
legal systems may pick and choose among this inventory, or tailor-make
other tools.
Oftentimes the choice among many of these tools would be better
handled if conducted at the level of contract types, rather than at the
wholesale level of contract law, a move that would allow the rule to be
178

JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC
OF LAW AND POLITICS 105 (1994).
179

DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY

Id.
On some of the difficult questions this commitment raises, see Omri
Ben-Shahar, Forward: Freedom from Contract, 2004 WISC. L. REV. 261.
181
See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799
(1941).
182
See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW § 2:101 cmt. B (Comm.
On European Contract Law, Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 2000); PRINCIPLES,
DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON
FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR), OUTLINE EDITION § II: 401 (Christian von Bar et
al. eds., 2009); EU COMMISSION, PROPOSAL FOR A COMMON EUROPEAN SALES
LAW § 39(2) (2011).
180
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informed by the type’s animating principle.183 Voluntariness may even
take different meanings in different contract spheres. Along these lines,
scholars have proposed that the parol evidence rule should be relaxed in
more interpersonal contexts and imposed strictly in high-value corporate
transactions, where the parties gain more from ex ante certainty and are
more likely to ensure the contract is the full expression of their
intentions.184 Despite this value in tailoring at the level of types, a
common overarching commitment to autonomy implies a transsubstantive concern for voluntariness,185 especially given the challenge
that the objective theory of contract poses for this value.186
(b) Autonomy as side constraint. While autonomy often recruits
community and utility to shape the multiple contract types that selfauthorship requires, these values do not always dovetail. Within any
particular type, autonomy’s role as the ultimate commitment of contract
implies that it should generally trump contract’s other values when they
conflict. Thus, in addition to the enabling role of autonomy in our theory,
it also fulfills a protective role by functioning as a “side constraint.”187
Usually, promoting contract’s other values – utility, community, or
a blend of the two – does not clash with, and indeed enhances the ultimate
value of autonomy. But there are cases when promoting the means might
undermine the end. Communitarian demands of loyalty that pose
183

This point applies equally to other general doctrines such as fraud and
unconscionability whose application varies depending on the context. See, e.g.,
Steven M. Haas, Contracting Around Fraud Under Delaware Law, 10 DEL. L.
REV. 49, 50-51 (2008); Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in
Formalism – the Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 1, 1-6 (2012).
184
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, The Plain Meaning
Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533,
534 (1998). Others have proposed varying default rules regarding parties’ intent
to be bound in different situations, such as preliminary contracting or spousal
promises. See, e.g. Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 95 VA. L. REV. 1437,
1480-87, 1488-97 (2009).
185
In this respect, our analysis converges with Ripstein’s account of a
“united will.” See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
186
See supra text accompanying notes 56-65.
187
See Stephen A. Smith, Future Freedom and Freedom of Contract, 59
MOD. L. REV. 167 (1995).

[9/12/2013 Draft]

FREEDOM OF CONTRACTS

45

excessive limitations on contractual parties’ exit (that is: on promisors’
freedom to change their mind) might collide with party autonomy.188
Efficient contracts between consumers and organizations may invoke
similar concerns, given that, unlike consumers, organizations have no
claim to autonomy.189 In many such conflicts, contract’s commitments to
community and to utility should give way to rules that best promote
contract’s ultimate value. This may justify, for example, limits on
enforceability of employee noncompete agreements,190 and help explain the
unilateral right of termination of long-term contracts, which is semiinalienable at least regarding certain contract types.191
We do not imply that autonomy straightforwardly and necessarily
trumps utility or community. Rather, our approach may require exploring
(at least) two alternative responses. Thus, it may imply that we should try
to resolve such conflicts by looking more closely at the meaning of the
utility or community value for people’s autonomy.192 Just as your gardenvariety contract limits one’s future options in the service of selfauthorship, the vibrancy of certain utility- or community-oriented contract
types may require curtailing certain future choices; and insofar as a
(complicated, to be sure) analysis of the overall effects of such limitations
on people’s self-authorship shows that they are positive, the
incommensurably higher status of autonomy poses no real difficulty.

188

See generally Leslie Green, Rights of Exit, 4 LEG. THEORY 165 (1998);
Dori Kimel, Promise, Contract, Personal Autonomy, and the Freedom to Change
One’s Mind, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2237853.
189
See MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A
LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 77-78 (1986).
190
See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology
Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 594-619 (1999) (attributing Silicon Valley’s dynamism in part
to limited enforcement of noncompete agreements); see also Ruth Simon & Angus
Loten, When A New Job Leads to a Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2013, at B1
(discussing national variation in enforceability).
191
See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, The Fiduciary Character of Agency and the
Interpretation of Instructions, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY
LAW (Andrew Gold & Paul Miller eds., forthcoming 2014).
192
Cf. Richard H. Pildes, Conceptions of Value in Legal Thought, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 1520, 1557 (1992).
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Other conflicts, however, are real and fundamental and may even
require a (seemingly impossible) tradeoff. In most of these cases,
autonomy should take priority. But we recognize the possibility that (in
rather rare cases, we assume) this presumption may be overridden if, and
only if, its costs to the utility or the community goods of contract pass a
sufficiently high threshold.193 We cannot hope fully to address here the
challenges of value incommensurability, so for now we just flag the
concern, and note that its implications for our liberal contract theory seem
no more intractable than for legal theory in general.194
3. How we differ from the economic analysis of contract. Finally,
because our freedom of contracts approach designates such a significant
role to utility and thus to the economic analysis of contract law, it may be
helpful to note briefly how our views differs from theirs. We see four
significant distinctions:
(a) Most basically, whereas the economic canon seeks to facilitate
preference satisfaction in order to maximize social welfare, we argue that
such facilitation is important to the extent it is conducive to people’s selfauthorship. This fundamental difference implies further key distinctions:
(b) As we have just noted, preferences that undermine self-authorship
should, in our account, be generally overridden. (c) Because we claim that
the goods of contracts sometimes are communitarian in nature, so that part
of their point is the process (and not just the outcome), we argue that not
all contract goods are amenable to the maximization formula economic
analysis employs. In other words, once the contractual relationship has a
significant intrinsic value, it can no longer be analyzed in strict instrumental
terms.195 And last but not least, (d) as we will further elaborate below, an
autonomy-based account of contracts implies that facilitating minoritarian
and utopian alternatives may be quite important even if it cannot be fully
justified in terms of demand.

193

Cf. ZAMIR & MEDINA, supra note 22, at 1-8, 79-104 (defending “threshold
deontology”).
194
See generally Cass Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law,
92 MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994).
195
See SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, EQUALITY AND TRADITION: QUESTIONS OF
VALUE IN MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 50 (2010).
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C. The Taxonomy of Contract Spheres
We have talked about contract values and their interrelations. This
is what makes our theory liberal and general. Now we provide the bridge
between our theory and contract law as a whole. To do so, we reject the
arm’s length widget sale as contract’s core and we offer, in its place, a
taxonomy of contract spheres that groups contracting practices according
to their distinctive subject matter and shared dilemmas.
1. The flattening effect of the arm’s length core. Like other critics
of the Willistonian strategy before us, we reject the arm’s length core as a
description of contract law.196 Our opposition is, we hope, particularly
pointed because it normatively relies on a commitment to autonomy, the
ultimate value Willistonian contract law purports to serve.
Contract theory had a distinctive twentieth-century trajectory that
elevated the arm’s length deal image to the core of contract, and, as a
byproduct, substantially obscured the generative role of diverse contract
types. Starting with Samuel Williston, through the early Restatements,
and now pervasive in law teaching, contract theory shifted from concern
with distinctive types to contract’s trans-substantive, stylized, and
seemingly universal elements, an approach that makes much of actual
contracting practice seem peripheral – or outside of contract law
altogether.197
But lawyers in practice cannot rely on “general” contract law to
understand the key elements of employment, family, real estate or other
real world contracts.198 To do so would often constitute malpractice.199
And yet, the paradigm of general contract law dominates contract theory.
This paradigm not only mis-describes contract law and understates its
196

See Roy Kreitner, Multiplicity in Contract Remedies, in COMPARATIVE
REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 19, 19–20, 38, 49 (Nili Cohen & Ewan
McKendrick eds., 2005). See generally Roy Kreitner, On the New Pluralism in
Contract Theory, 45 SUFF. U. L. REV. 915 (2012).
197
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 20.
198
Similarly, law students in upper-level contracts classes must leave aside
much of what they learned their first-year. By contrast, other private law fields
did not go through quite the same theoretical flattening.
199
Cf. BRIAN H. BIX, CONTRACT LAW: RULES, THEORY, AND CONTEXT 15960 (2012) (emphasizing the significance of the differences among contract types).
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autonomy-enhancing potential; it also generates unnecessary confusion.200
Consider the following four concrete examples:
(a) Bailment. First, the flattening effect of general contract seems
responsible for much of the doctrinal muddle now troubling bailment law.
The dominant paradigm interprets the prevailing doctrine as repudiating
the contractual nature of bailments. Why? Because the bailee’s
responsibility for loss or damage is usually based on a standard of ordinary
care, in contrast to “general” contract’s typical strict obligation to
perform.201 The possibility that strict liability exceptions threaten to
swallow the negligence rule202 is less troubling if both the “rule” and its
“exceptions” are understood as majoritarian defaults of the bailment
contract type. Rather than decide whether to treat bailments “as
contractual in nature,”203 and thus import all of the “general” contract law,
reformers should focus on the recurring dilemmas of bailment contracts.
(b) Liquidated damages. Another example of the detrimental
effects of the arm’s length paradigm comes from the standard debate over
liquidated damages. From our perspective, this debate seems frustratingly
futile. While most arguments in favor of the prevailing rule of ex post
fairness review anticipate certain types of contracts (in which promisors
are vulnerable to making suboptimal choices), most of the claims
criticizing the rule assume a very different set of contract types (where
sophisticated parties use liquidated damages in anticipation of possible
unverifiable harms of breach).204 Each argument is right in its own sphere,
and the rule should likely vary by sphere, rather than be held artificially
constant to conform to a misplaced notion of “general” contract law.205
200

Our discussion below focuses on the effects of contract’s conceptualization
on adjudication. But it surely implies that contract’s autonomy-enhancing
functioning would be improved if the muddles we identify were removed.
201
See R.M. Helmholz, Bailment Theories and the Liabilities of Bailees:
The Elusive Standard of Reasonable Care, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 97, 99 (1992).
202
See id. at 109-29 (describing expansion of strict liability exceptions).
203
Id. at 99.
204
Compare, e.g., Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees Prefer
Supracompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for Damage Measures,
100 YALE L.J. 369 (1990) with Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition
and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 225-36 (1995).
205
For indications that courts reduce scrutiny of liquidated damages in cases
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(c) Promissory estoppel.
Similar confusion and potential
distortions were generated by the attempt to align intra-family contracts
with contracts between strangers. Thus, the perception that once
promissory estoppel was adopted for intra-familial contracts, it must apply
to others has led to a morass of practical and doctrinal confusion.
Businesses were forced to contend with the risk of unexpected obligations
by the application of ex post judicial enforcement of clearly invalid
promises on equity grounds in the employment and franchise contexts.206
Scholars noted the doctrinal confusion introduced by promissory estoppel
into these contract contexts and some feared that the doctrine would
consume traditional contract bright line rules aimed at the arm’s length
contract contexts, such as the doctrine of consideration.207
(d) Efficient breach. By the same token, the theory of efficient
breach runs into its most serious criticism and doctrinal problems when it
is applied to promises made in the context of a thick community, most
particularly marriage.208 These problems could be avoided if this doctrine
were applied selectively to contract types, rather than assuming that once
introduced to contract law, it must be applied generally.209
These brief case studies do not simply reflect the obvious
prescription that, for abstract principles to be properly applied, they need
to be carefully adjusted to their context. Rather, the required differences
they highlight are best explained by reference to the different animating
involving sophisticated parties, see Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party
Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75 MO. L. REV. 493, 512 (2010).
206
See HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 6:12 (2013);
Gregory M. Duhl, Red Owl’s Legacy, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 297, 307-11 (2003).
207
See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory
Estoppel, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1197-99 (1998). For other doctrines that are at
risk, see Michael B. Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule: Promissory Estoppel’s
Next Conquest?, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1383-85 (1983).
208
See Avery Katz, Virtue Ethics and Efficient Breach, 45 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 777, 794-97 (2012); Margaret F Brinig, “Money Can’t Buy Me Love”: A
Contrast Between Damages in Family Law and Contract, 27 J. CORP. L. 567,
572-79, 589 (2002).
209
See also, e.g., Brett E. Lewis, Secondary Obligors and the Restatement
Third of Suretyship and Guaranty: For Love or Money, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 861
(1997) (criticizing suretyship law for not distinguishing between compensated
and uncompensated sureties).
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principles of contract types that have been improperly lumped together.
These more fundamental differences may derive from the typical
normative commitments of a contract type (as in the intra-family vs.
business contracts) or from its distinctive subject matter (as in bailment,
or, for that matter, suretyship). Such examples, and numerous others,
suggest that in dealing with discrete doctrinal questions, we should
examine the normative desirability of competing rules vis-à-vis the
animating principles of their specific contract types (an inquiry that
requires us to present this principle in its best light possible).
But contract theory cannot return to the pre-Williston list of
contract categories. That list was an atheoretical mishmash. What’s
needed is to replace the old abstractions of the orthodox “freedom of
contract” model with a theory-driven and descriptively well-formed
taxonomy for “freedom of contracts.”
2. The four spheres of contracting. An autonomy-regarding
theory requires a taxonomy that reflects the typical contexts in which
people enter contracts and responds to the distinctive dilemmas that arise
in those interactions. There are many ways such a taxonomy could be
constructed. Here we offer one that collects contract types into spheres.
The subject matter of our contracts is bound to make a difference
regarding the kind of ideals that law can plausibly embrace and hope to
further. Thus, along one dimension we distinguish between contracts in
which the subject matter primarily concerns “people” or “things.” This
distinction is neither exhaustive nor stable.210 But the division has some
appeal: it reflects real distinctions in how contract law operates, and it has
the virtue (perhaps) of historical pedigree. Blackstone divided contract in
part between “rights of persons” and “rights of things.”211 Our second
dimension concerns whether the locus of contracting is in some sense
“private” or “public.” This axis is even less stable than the former (and it
has been subject to much criticism), but again reflects practices oriented
toward the internal, domestic, or personal versus those that are relatively
210

Our cautious language derives not only from the fact that this is a
preliminary effort, but also from our commitment to a functional dynamic mode
of taxonomic work. See generally DAGAN, supra note 87, at ch.6.
211
See ATIYAH, supra note 10, at 102-03; Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of
Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 327-50 (1979).
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more external. These two axes yield four salient spheres of contracting:
family, home, employment, and commerce (fig. 1):
Subject Matter

Locus

People

Things

Private

1. Family

2. Home

Public

3. Employment

4. Commerce

FIGURE 1: Four Spheres of Contracting
While one can imagine other ways to divide the contractual
universe (we have no commitment to these axes or labels), this taxonomy
is helpful here because it is conducive to freedom of contracts’ injunction
of intra-sphere multiplicity. It highlights the obligation of liberal contract
law to support choice within each familiar category of human activity,
such that, within each sphere, we see contract types that often are
substitutes for each other. So, (1) in the sphere of family, we might see
pre-nuptial, civil union, and co-habitation contracts; (2) in the home: real
estate purchase and lease contracts; (3) in employment: at-will, for cause,
independent contractor, and union contracts; and (4) in commerce: sales,
consumer, insurance, and derivative contracts.
Note that in the commerce sphere, the types just mentioned are not
substitutes for each other, but instead reflect distinctive contracting
practices. The sub-spheres of commerce-related contract activity depend
(roughly) on the sophistication of the parties and the tangibility of the
contract’s subject (as with figure 1 above, nothing turns in our theory on
commitment to these particular labels). The distinctions suggest a second
matrix with four sub-spheres within the sphere of commerce: (1)
consumer: including ordinary consumer transactions and software
licenses, (2) lending and insurance: mortgages, credit cards, health and life
insurance, (3) sales/business: from commercial sales to partnerships and
LLCs, and (4) finance/risk: derivatives, guarantees (fig. 2).
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Type of thing

Relative
Sophistication

Tangible

Intangible

Individual

1. Consumer

2. Lending/Insurance

Corporation

3. Sales/Business

4. Finance/Risk

FIGURE 2: Sub-Spheres of Commerce
Why are there so many more contract types within the sphere of
commerce? In part, the answer must lie in the stronger incentives for
individual parties to invest in creating new contract types within this
sphere. Even relatively moderate demand can justify creation of a new
type, so long as that type responds to the balance of contract goods that
enough people seek.212 Note that the large number of contract types here,
available even to individuals, suggests that people can handle new types
without too much danger of confusion. In other words, communication
costs – a concern emphasized recently by private law theorists – does not
justify adherence to the conception of one “general” contract law.213
By contrast, there are far fewer contract types in the noncommerce spheres. Why? Perhaps there are weaker individual incentives
and more substantial collective action problems in demanding new types.
But that does not mean that there should not be more types. The
commerce sphere suggests that confusion among types is not a significant
problem, and the autonomy perspective suggests that, where effective
demand is weak, the state shoulders a concomitantly greater responsibility
to supply valuable new types to ensure sufficient diversity and choice.
212

Consider, for example, the recent emergence of the “benefit corporation” –
blending profit and social objectives – in about a dozen states. See generally J.
William Callison, Benefit Corporations, Innovation and Statutory Design, REGENT
L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
213
The reason for the current over-emphasis on communication costs is that
they are too often mistakenly conflated with the interests of third parties (whose
interest is best cast in terms of verification), rather than with the consolidation of
expectations of the parties inter se and the expression of ideals on core categories of
interpersonal interaction. See DAGAN, supra note 52, at 18-20, 31-35.
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D. The Goods of Diverse Contract Types
The final step in creating a general and liberal theory of contract
law is to specify the link between contract spheres, diverse types, and the
values people seek. The multiplicity of contract types is neither chaotic
nor unprincipled. Rather, it can be explained by reference to the recurring
dilemmas of the underlying contract spheres and the obligation to provide
real choice within each of these spheres, including a choice among the
good of interpersonal relationships, the maximization of joint surplus, or a
complex and shifting mix of these goals. In other words, other than the
ultimate commitment to autonomy, values in contract law are local, not
global.
1. Value diversity in contract types. We do not deny that certain
contract spheres may be more amenable to particular values. Thus, some
contract types, particularly in the sphere of commerce, are mostly about
economic gains – maximizing joint surplus by securing efficiencies of
specialization and risk-allocation – with social benefits being merely a
side effect. Other contract types, say in the family sphere, are more about
the intrinsic good of being part of a plural subject, where the raison d’être
of the contract refers more to one’s identity and interpersonal
relationships, while the attendant economic benefits are perceived as
helpful byproducts rather than the sole (or at least the primary) motive for
cooperation.
But commitment to contractual autonomy requires attention not
only to diversity among spheres, but also crucially to meaningful choice
within spheres. Within a particular sphere of contracting, contract law
should offer a sufficiently diverse range of contract types, each
representing a distinct balance of animating values. The majority may
prefer one contract type, but within each contracting sphere free
individuals should be enabled to contract based on a different value
balance. Having forms available to reject makes one’s chosen contract
type even more of an expression of individual autonomy.
This is, again, most clearly the case regarding long-term business
arrangements, where contact law (in the appropriate, broad sense of the
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word) offers more than one set of defaults, so as to facilitate more than
one type of interpersonal interaction:214 from agency contracts, through
partnership contracts (notably LLCs and LLPs), to the various forms of
corporate contracts (from close corporations to publicly-held
corporations).215 Each of these contract types is characterized by its own
governance structure and set of solutions to the typical difficulties (notably
agency costs) that would probably have inhibited such business activities
but for their legal facilitation.216
Whereas the prescription of multiplicity of contract types seems
straightforward, its implementation is not always simple. As a first rule of
thumb, for a contract type to do its autonomy-enhancing work, it should be
guided by one robust animating value that can effectively consolidate
expectations and clearly express normative ideals. This rule implies that
each contract type should be rather narrow, but that many should be
offered. Thus, a contract type should be split if it addresses too-divergent
values, as has indeed happened with leaseholds, now largely bifurcated into
residential and commercial types.217 Opposing this view, we see four
concerns that may require actively limiting multiplicity:218
214

See Terry A. O’Neill, Toward a New Theory of the Closely-Held Firm,
24 SETON HALL L. REV. 603, 605 (1993). See also Edward P. Welch & Robert
S. Saunders, Freedom and Its Limits in the Delaware General Corporation Law,
33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 845, 846-47 (2008) (arguing that Delaware law increases
freedom of contract by creating a “menu” of available options – with mandatory
restrictions for corporations but not for partnerships or limited liability
companies – so firms can easily “brand” themselves).
215
See generally, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND
CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION (3rd ed., 2009); LARRY E.
RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF UNINCORPORATION (2010).
216
See, e,g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 34-35 (1991).
217
Compare 1 FRIEDMAN ON LEASES § 1:2.1 (Patrick A. Randolph, Jr. ed., 5th
ed., rel. 20, 2012) (describing modern approach to residential leases as regulatory
and replete with “non-waivable rights and obligations [that] may have little to do
with the history of lease concepts”), with id. § 1:2.2 (observing the lack of any such
“wholesale substitution for traditional property notions in commercial leasing.”).
218
Another possible concern is that disaggregating contract law to distinct
types may hinder cross-fertilization and learning. But this risk is likely to
materialize only if we lose sight of the common denominators of the various
contract types.
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(a) Cognitive constraints. If there are too many distinct types, then
multiplicity itself may curtail people’s effective choice – a paradox that
cognitive psychologists have found.219 Addressing such cognitive limits is
a delicate challenge for contract law design.
(b) Boundary disputes. Multiplicity may also trigger boundary
disputes arising from ex post opportunistic maneuvering.220 This
difficulty does not negate the value of contract type diversity, partly
because having in mind a salient model (or a few salient models) of the
intended transaction likely reduces the probability of ex post
misunderstandings – at least by comparison with the alternative of
contracting through the necessarily vague “general” contract law. But
boundary disputes nonetheless pose a challenge to legal architects. Their
cost is probably reduced to the extent that law successfully conveys the
animating principles of the various contract types. We hope our call to
reinvigorate their significance in contract law scholarship and education
makes a modest contribution in this direction. But this may not be
enough. So we acknowledge that boundary arbitrage concerns may justify
heightened formalities for entry – and such formalities should be refined
with an eye to ensuring that both parties have the same contract type in
mind.221
(c) Market structure. In certain market structures, multiplicity
might undermine the autonomy of weak parties rather than, as usual,
augmenting it. Offering a few alternative, standardized types for the same
activity typically opens options for weaker parties just as competition over
prices increases consumers’ choice. But in certain asymmetric scenarios –
say, markets for unskilled workers in times of non-negligible
unemployment – multiplicity may generate a race to the bottom that would
curtail autonomy. To the extent contract law reformers subscribe to our
219

See generally BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY
MORE IS LESS (2004).
220
See Martjin W. Hesselink, Non-Mandatory Rules in European Contract
Law, 1 EUR. REV. CONTRACT L. 43, 48-49 (2005).
221
To preempt an objection, we think such “entry rules” should be shaped
so that they could not be fairly treated as significant impediments to people’s
freedom of action. An alternative strategy to formalities on entry, which we
disfavor, is one of ex post equitable inquiry.
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approach, they need to be cautious not to provide multiple forms where
doing so likely undermines autonomy.
(d) Political economy. Certain contract types may be particularly
vulnerable to the risk of interest group rent seeking.222 When the
autonomy-reducing consequences of such rent seeking likely outweigh the
autonomy benefits from an additional contract type, reformers should
again not support the new type.
2. Tailoring law to local animating values. Freedom of contracts
requires that contract law offer different, but equally valuable and
obtainable, frameworks of interpersonal interaction. A mosaic of contract
types within a single sphere of contracting activity is valuable – indeed,
indispensable – for autonomy.
(a) Business contracts. To sustain such a mosaic, contract law needs
to tailor its rules to the local animating values of each distinct type. This
is implicitly the goal of the Schwartz and Scott model. By concentrating
on sophisticated organizations seeking the maximization of joint surplus
as their ideal-typic contracting parties, they insist that business contract
law should be minimal, that is, it should focus on giving the parties wide
latitude and enforcing their deal.223
By contrast, as contract types emphasize more relational goods, the
contracting parties are increasingly understood, by themselves and others,
as active participants in a joint endeavor, as members in a purposive
community.224 Thus, as Macneil emphasizes, governance is of the essence
regarding many thick relational contract types and law should aim at
developing governance structures that sustain interdependence and are
conducive to long term trust and solidarity.225

222

See Nathan B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract Law, 98 GEO. L.
J. 77, 86–90 (2009).
223
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
224
For an example of “general” contract law that supports contracting
parties in their contractual community, consider the duty of good faith and fair
dealing. Although frequently said to inhere in all contracts, in practice it is
highly context-dependent, as it should be. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & RICHARD E.
SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 719 (7th ed. 2008).
225
See supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.

[9/12/2013 Draft]

FREEDOM OF CONTRACTS

57

(b) Agency. Consider, for example, the agency contract type, which
structures the agent-principal relationship. A principal is bound by (and
may be liable for) her agent’s acts.226 This authority to bind generates
vulnerability. Some implications of this vulnerability are straightforward:
where an agent binds her principal while acting only in the scope of her
apparent authority, he has a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty.227
Others are more subtle; they imply intricate governance rules,228 dealing
with topics such as disclosure,229 consultation,230 and adjustments.231
Because these governance rules are not easily amenable to any form of
maximization function, agency and other relational contract types are
qualitatively different from contracts for the pursuit of efficiency gains.232
(c) Family contracts. Finally, as we reach the social pole of
contracting – say in the context of marriage contracts – the contractual
community is also part of the actor’s own self-understanding.233 As this
plural identity becomes a more constitutive element of each individual’s
self-understanding, applying responses from the commercial sphere
threatens to undermine, rather than advance, the goods these contract types
aim to encourage. It is thus not surprising that premarital agreements and
separation agreements are governed by a unique set of rules – think about
the fairness review that typifies the former and the possible judicial
modification for change of circumstances that characterizes the latter –

226

On the agent’s authority to bind the principal, see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 6.01–6.02, 2.01–2.02 (2006); on the principal’s liability,
see id. § 7.03–7.08.
227
See id. § 8.09 cmt. b.
228
Cf. DeMott, supra note 191 (forthcoming 2014) (“direction, supervision
[and] authority . . . loom large in how agency relationship functions.”).
229
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.11 (2006); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20(1) (2000).
230
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20(1)
(2000).
231
Adjustments of relations between the principal and agent are governed in
part by the doctrine of ratification. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§
4.01–4.08 (2006).
232
See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
233
See, e.g., MARGARET GILBERT, LIVING TOGETHER: RATIONALITY,
SOCIALITY, AND OBLIGATION 2, 8 (1996).
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which derive more from the typical characteristics of this contract type
than from any general principle of contract as a whole.234
As these examples demonstrate, our distinction between utility and
community is not about whether the contracting activity is economic in
some absolute sense. After all, we are dealing with contracts that always
have economic implications, especially at the “end-game” when the
contractual community breaks down and people move from cooperation to
breach. But colorful dramas at breach should not obscure the daily – and
ultimately more germane – mid-game life of contract types.235 Hence, we
focus on the role of contract types as forums for various sorts of
interpersonal relationships – with thick, thin, or no community, and we
argue that the predominant character of each contract type along this
spectrum affects (or at least should affect) its doctrinal architecture.
Even rules about end-game breach can be analyzed from this
perspective because they can, and often do, serve as background norms to
channel and shape participants’ expectations in the varying contract types
at stake.236 In other words, mid-game purposes dealing with the daily and
the mundane should inform end-game rules dealing with failures and
pathologies. These distinctions suggest a concrete area for contract law
reform: in relational contracts, perhaps require the parties to share the
efficiency gain secured by the promisor’s alternative transaction after
breach, contra the general law, derived from wealth-maximizing contract
types, that disallows such recovery.237

234

See Brian H. Bix, Contract Rights and Remedies, and the Divergence
Between Law and Morality, 21 RATIO JURIS 194, 203 (2008). See generally
Brian H. Bix, Private Ordering and Family Law, 23 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 249 (2010).
235
See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the
Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1796-98
(1996).
236
See Dagan & Heller, supra note 70, at 597-98; Carolyn J. Frantz &
Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 95-98 (2004).
237
See DAGAN, supra note 66, at 278-82.
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IV. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
We have now set out a general and liberal theory of contract law.
We cannot hope to explore in this (relatively) concise Article all the
possible challenges our theory must face or the opportunities it may open
up. But before we conclude, we need to address briefly one major
normative concern, clarify our position on another set of more concrete
issues, and outline a few reformist directions our approach recommends.
A. Neutrality and Residual Contracting
Some readers may worry that rather than serving our liberal
commitments, a freedom of contracts regime actually betrays them. Our
approach, according to this argument, violates “the precept of state
neutrality” both in its endorsement of self-authorship as contract’s
ultimate value and in privileging a limited (albeit not insignificant)
number of contract types.238 Wouldn’t a more neutral regime that equally
supports all possible arrangements that people might want to take up be
superior for the task of facilitating people’s ability to choose and revise
their various endeavors and relationships? And wouldn’t focusing on
contract types obscure the significance of “a vibrant general contract law”
not only for the sake of legislative (or reporting or teaching) economy, but
also as a liberating device that allows individuals to reject the state’s
favored forms of interaction and decide for themselves how to mold their
interpersonal interactions?239
Let’s start with this last point. Because we believe that contact
types share a commitment to voluntariness, we do not call for eradicating
all general contract doctrines, and agree that some – although by no means
all – doctrinal implications of this commitment take a trans-substantive
238

This critique blends reference to both “neutrality as a first-order principle
of justice” and to “neutrality as a second-order principle of justification.” On this
distinction and its significance to theoretical liberalism, see Peter De Marneffe,
Liberalism, Liberty, and Neutrality, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 253 (1990).
239
See Martjin W. Hesselink, Private Law Principles, Pluralism and
Perfectionism, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW AND EUROPEAN PRIVATE
LAW (forthcoming 2013).
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form.240 But voluntariness does not require parties to contract explicitly
about their relationship.
A forced contracting system would be quite burdensome, rendering
certain types of interpersonal relationships too costly to enter into, at least
for some. In many contexts it would also still miss the “authentic”
substantively neutral position, because all contracting schemes ratify the
parties’ contingent background expectations and power imbalances, so
that what may seem an innocent equilibrium generated by neutral market
processes is oftentimes a path dependent contingency that, as such, should
not necessarily be privileged.241 Further, even if, or to the extent that, the
freedom of contracts paradigm may entail a crowding out effect, this effect
seems to be offset by the greater choice of options provided by contract
types that would cease to exist, or become available only in rather
circumscribed settings, were it not for the support of the law, as well as by
a greater choice-making capability within legally facilitated types.
Finally, whatever detrimental effects law’s active facilitation may
entail is likely to be remedied if contract law takes seriously our
prescription of reinforcing minoritarian and utopian contract forms
(discussed below) and properly structures the residual category of
freestanding contracting. Indeed, it seems indispensable to freedom that
people be able to “invent” their own private forms of contracting outside
of any familiar contract type (a freedom that distinguishes contract from
property). The law governing such residual contracting should be shaped
with this purpose in mind, rather than piggyback on the arm’s length
commercial contract that the Willistonian project imagined as the default.
Our approach also seems to score quite high on the neutrality test.
To see why, realize that contract law cannot practically give equal support
to all the possible arrangements people may want to make; further, it
should not even try to offer such support because having too many options
may curtail choice just as much as having too few.242 Because law’s
240

See supra text accompanying notes 181-185.
See generally Tom Ginsburg et al., Libertarian Paternalism, Path
Dependence, and Temporary Law, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. Pt. I (forthcoming 2014);
Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1161, 1171-83 (2003).
242
See supra text accompanying note 219.
241

[9/12/2013 Draft]

FREEDOM OF CONTRACTS

61

support makes a difference – very few contract types would have looked
as they do, and would have worked as well as they do, without the active
support of law – contract law necessarily prefers certain types of
arrangements over others.
Furthermore, even respecting each contract type, law cannot be
strictly neutral because every choice of a set of legal rules governing a
particular contract type facilitates and entrenches one ideal vision of the
good in that particular context. But the obligation to provide a diverse
menu of contract types imposes less than its alternative, namely: the onetype-fits-all of traditional contract theories with their global, overarching
principles. Finally, as a power-conferring body of law, which people can
but need not invoke or use in pursuing their objectives, it is hard to think
of any intelligible, let alone neutral, alternative to autonomy as selfauthorship as contract’s ultimate value.243
B. Mandatory Rules and Sticky Defaults
Our fundamental commitment to voluntariness244 implies that
people should generally be able to choose not only among various contract
types, but also terms within each one of them so as to ensure that they best
serve their own conception of the good and the proper means for realizing
it, given their particular needs and circumstances.
Mandatory rules are troublesome from this perspective because
they do not accommodate heterogeneity, let alone idiosyncrasy. Thus,
where no third-party negative externalities are at stake, contract law
should not mandate its rules; rather, people should be able modify them at
will, tailoring their arrangements in accordance with how they prefer to
243

See supra text accompanying note 64. Can democracy serve as such a
value, so that contract law could safely and solely rely on whatever choices our
elected representatives entrench in their legislated products? We do not think so.
Not only does this suggestion seem to conflate the search for substantive moral
truth with that of institutional legitimacy (which this Article brackets), but it also
overstates the comparative advantage of legislatures vis-à-vis courts in private
law matters. Cf. Hanoch Dagan, Judges and Property, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 17 (Shyam Balganesh ed., 2013).
244
See supra text accompanying notes 178-186.
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cast their interpersonal relationships. To be sure, in certain contexts, law
may legitimately regulate and at times even strictly scrutinize such optouts to guarantee that they indeed reflect people’s informed and rational
choices. But, to the extent possible, contract laws should try overcoming
problems of information asymmetry, cognitive biases, and strategic
behavior as well as engage in the cultural production of stable
expectations regarding contract types by prescribing sticky defaults, rather
than curtailing choice by using mandatory rules.245
While the discussion so far does not diverge from that of a more
traditional freedom of contract analysis, our perspective raises two
additional explanations for at least some of the mandatory rules and sticky
defaults that are so prevalent throughout contract’s diverse domain.
One reason for refinement emerges from the heightened ambition
of the classical freedom of contract paradigm. That model examines the
impediments to informed cooperation through just one prototypical
contract form. Working from the arm’s length merchant transaction, the
conventional wisdom of freedom of contract analysis struggles to justify
the diverse settings in which regulation is warranted. By contrast, our
freedom of contracts paradigm already anticipates a multiplicity of such
regulations corresponding to the multiplicity of contract types. It is no
stretch for us to claim that contract law must fine-tune its devices to
address quite diverse challenges.246
While this first justification for regulating opt outs focuses on
assuring that contract types are viable, notwithstanding the systemic
difficulties they would otherwise encounter, the second turns to the
concern that easy mutability may undermine their cultural function. To
give an example from fiduciary law, the “general” contract law rhetoric of
gap-filling and optionality may signal indifference towards fiduciaries’
duty of loyalty, thus diluting the expressive function of fiduciary law.247

245

Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1436 (2012). Admittedly, at times, mandatory rules may be the
only credible solution. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 102, at 207-14.
246
See supra Sections III.D.2 & III.A.2.
247
See Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the
Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67, 69-70, 91, 116 (2005). Cf. Dagan,
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Insofar as these effects threaten the social norms that seem crucial to
sustaining the fiduciary form, they may also pose a valid concern for
liberal contract law.
On its face, acknowledging these concerns may seem to be in
tension with the commitment to autonomy. But it is not. Properly
applied, they only mean that opt out may be justifiably regulated if and
only if three conditions obtain: (1) the regulation is indispensable to the
viability of that contract type, so that without it people would have fewer
options regarding a given activity; (2) people can freely invoke the
regulated contract type, namely that they are also able to engage in that
activity using an alternative, less regulated contract type; and finally (3)
the regulation entails the minimal interference with people’s choice
necessary to overcome the relevant material or expressive concerns.
The first condition highlights the possible autonomy-enhancing
role of mandatory rules and sticky defaults in facilitating, at times even
enabling, contract types. Our analysis of consumer contracts as being
aimed at allowing people to make quick, anonymous, and secure
transactions248 may be a prime example for a contract type that would be
meaningless without extensive regulation.
The second condition is more demanding. It requires that there
would be sufficient intra-sphere multiplicity regarding the activity and that
people indeed make informed choices when invoking the more regulated
contract type. People who refuse to enter into what they perceive as an
overly-regulated contract type should not be deprived of an area of selfauthorship.
(Think again about the possibility of becoming an
independent contractor left open to someone who finds the immutable
rules and sticky defaults that typify employment contracts objectionable,
or the ability to engage in an arm’s length purchase through sales law if
one objects to the constraints that constitute consumer contracts.)
Finally, the third condition highlights the significance of sticky
defaults of various kinds as a preferred alternative to mandatory rules. Ian
Ayres has recently demonstrated that sticky defaults may be justified on
supra note 245, at 1436 (referring to a prenuptial agreement providing that a
given marriage would last for a week or a month).
248
See supra text accompanying note 177.
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efficiency grounds.249 Our account shows that at times they may serve an
important role in enhancing autonomy. Thus, for example, fiduciary law
can, and to some extent already does, address the expressive concerns
noted above,250 while avoiding mandatory rules, by using “impeding
altering rules”251 which allow only limited, specific initial waivers of the
duty of loyalty and incorporate further mechanisms to ensure the informed
consent of the beneficiary (or of the benefactor) and maybe even their
periodic reconfirmation.252
Interrogating the validity of mandatory rules and sticky defaults
along these lines may not redeem them all. But this refined analysis of
their relationship to autonomy suggests that at least some of these rules
may be attractive features, rather than defects, of a liberal, autonomyenhancing contract law regime.
C. Legal Reforms
We hope that by now we were able to convince you that freedom
of contracts, rather than only freedom of contract, provides both a credible
description of contract law’s heterogeneous terrain and a promising
normative foundation that justifies many of its otherwise puzzling
features.
1. Concrete examples.
Our approach generates numerous
theoretical and doctrinal propositions. To note a few, we: (1)
reconceptualize consumer transactions as “no-community” interactions,253

249

See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt Outs: An Economic Analysis of Altering
Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 2097 (2012) (sticky defaults can minimize the costs
of party error (or judicial error) as well as channel contractors efforts towards
means that better control externalities).
250
See supra text accompanying note 247.
251
Ayres, supra note 249, at 2086.
252
See Hanoch Dagan & Sharon Hannes, Managing Our Money: The Law
of Financial Fiduciaries as a Private Law Institution, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 190, at § III.B.1.
253
See supra text accompanying notes 154-156 & 175-177. Consider also,
along these lines, the way we analyzed the choice between contracts of franchise
and commercial agency. See supra text accompanying note 128.
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(2) reconcile a doctrinal puzzle in bailment law,254 (3) recast the liquidated
damages debate,255 (4) address the confusion around promissory
estoppel,256 (5) highlight the cultural significance of contract types such as
suretyship and fiduciary law,257 (6) cabin Schwartz and Scott’s work to
settings where the parties seek solely to maximize the contractual
surplus,258 (7) suggest that promisees in relational contracts get a share of
the profits captured by their promisors through their efficient breach,259 (8)
offer an autonomy rationale for semi-inalienable rights of termination in
long-term contracts and limited enforcement of noncompete clauses in
employment contracts,260 (9) (cautiously) conclude that wherever no
external effects are applicable, sales law be an available alternative to
consumer contract law,261 and (10) refocus the debate over mandatory
rules and sticky defaults, discussed just above.
In these and other cases, the key lesson of our freedom of contracts
approach is to use the animating principle of the particular contract type,
rather than any “global” principle of “general” contract law, as the
benchmark for evaluating the law and prescribing guidelines for its proper
evolution.262
2. Market for new types. Another direction for reform, the market
for contract types, is implicit in our discussion of the taxonomy of contract
types and the liberal obligation to provide intra-sphere diversity, but it
requires some elaboration. For the most part, creation of new contract
types has been demand-driven. We agree with efficiency-based contract
theories that demand should be an important driver of legal innovation;
demand for new contract types generally justifies their legal facilitation.263
In the commercial sphere, there are powerful economic forces catalyzing
254

See supra text accompanying notes 201-203.
See supra text accompanying note 204.
256
See supra text accompanying notes 206-209; see also supra note 184.
257
See supra text accompanying notes 162-166 & 247.
258
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
259
See supra text accompanying note 237.
260
See supra text accompanying note 191.
261
See supra text accompanying notes 143-147.
262
Recall also, along these lines, our analysis of agency contracts and
marriage contract. See supra text accompanying notes 226-234.
263
But not always. See supra notes 219-222 and accompanying text.
255
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demand – legal entrepreneurs see value from one-off creation of new
forms that are then standardized, replicated, and sometimes codified as
discrete types – so the task of contract law can be mostly reactive.264
There is little reason here to think that long-standing market failures will
prevent the introduction of valuable new forms, though path dependency
and stickiness in legal norms may still suggest some role for active legal
shaping of new forms.265
But an autonomy-enhancing view implies an obligation – distinct
from efficiency theories – that contract law should respond favorably to
people’s innovations even absent significant demand. As people’s ends
move away from strict maximization of economic surplus – that is, for
most contracting – there is less reason to believe that market-driven
contract types offer us what we need as free individuals. In part, this is
because the social benefits of such new contract types are hard for an
individual legal entrepreneur to capture. Thus, an autonomy-enhancing
contract law should prioritize settings where law’s enabling role can best
support autonomy through new contracting practices.
While it is difficult to expect that legal systems would routinely
invent new contract types, they should favorably respond to innovations
even absent significant demand, including innovations based on minority
views and utopian theories, insofar as these outliers have the potential to
add valuable options for human flourishing that significantly broaden
people’s choices.266
264

See Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contract and Innovation: The Limited Role of
Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Forms, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2013).
265
This is (roughly) the reason why William Eskridge calls for a legislative
study commission in his celebration of what he describes as the emergence of “a
pluralistic family law which relies on ‘a utilitarian framework.’” William N.
Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided Choice Regime of Menus,
Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1891 (2012). Similarly,
long-standing market failures in design of mortgage derivative contracts
catalyzed recent legislative interventions. See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK
ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS
INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES xvi (2008).
266
Indeed, rather than inhibiting experimentalism – as Oman, supra note
222, at 94–105, argues – a pluralist contract law, at least in our version, fosters
experimentalism.
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For example, our approach suggest reforming the sphere of
employment, not just to allow more certain choice between employee and
independent contractor status, as we proposed earlier,267 but also by
developing innovative new contract types. One possibility would be to
facilitate job-sharing arrangements that stabilize defaults regarding
responsibility, attribution, decision making mechanisms, time division,
sharing space and equipment, and availability on off days.268 Another
type could require an employee to be terminated only “for cause” (the
explicit choice between a for-cause default and the current dominant “atwill” default could help clarify the employer’s obligations to the employee
in a way that formal law so far has not achieved269). Finally, employment
contract law can add a viable category of phased retirement that may be
autonomy-enhancing by reducing the financial and psychological burdens
of suddenly ending employment, while delivering significant benefits to
employers by keeping experienced labor in the workforce at a lower
cost.270
267

See supra text accompanying notes 140-142.
The Federal government has often been proactive in facilitating creation
of flexible workplaces. For an outline of the government’s job-sharing policies,
see U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONAL MANAGEMENT, http://www.opm.gov/
employment_and_benefits/worklife/officialdocuments/handbooksguides/pt_empl
oy_jobsharing/pt08.asp. For a general overview of flexible work arrangements,
discussion of pros and cons, and a rich selection of secondary sources, see
CHRISTINE AVERY & DIANE ZABEL, THE FLEXIBLE WORKPLACE: A
SOURCEBOOK OF INFORMATION AND RESEARCH 37–80 (2001).
269
Empirical studies have shown that most employees believe their
employment can be terminated only for-cause, yet about 85% of non-union
employees can be fired at-will. See Jesse Rudy, What They Don't Know Won't
Hurt Them: Defending Employment-at-Will in Light of Findings That Employees
Believe They Possess Just Cause Protection, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
307, 309-10 (2002).
270
Gradual retirement programs can benefit all the relevant stakeholders.
See Tunga Kantarci & Arthur van Soerst, Gradual Retirement: Preferences and
Limitations, NIH Public Access, manuscript at 15–16 (2010), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2862495/pdf/nihms-193194.pdf.
But significant regulatory hurdles remain in the United States. E.g., U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, Employee Benefits Sec. Admin., Report on Phased Retirement,
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/2008ACreport2.html (recommending tax
and other legislative reforms).
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Part of the value of these (and many other) minoritarian or utopian
forms is precisely that most people would not choose them. Autonomy
requires that people have the ability to choose from among meaningful,
distinct options. We are freer people, we are more confident in being the
authors of our lives, not just through the contract types we choose, but also
through those we affirmatively reject. Therefore, even if there is no
market demand (yet) for certain new contract types, even if they might
appeal to only a small fragment of potential contracting parties, contract
law should ensure availability of some such types.
While liberal contract law has an obligation to support new
contract types, there are limits. At a certain point, the marginal value from
adding another type is likely to be nominal in terms of autonomy gains.271
When our autonomy obligations are satisfied, then contract law has
offered enough types. For those who still want something more or
different, they can custom craft their own contract – that is, they retain the
classical freedom of contract.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Once released from the straightjacket of classical contract theory –
with its search for a unifying principle as its common core – contract law
proves to be fertile ground for autonomy-enhancing legal creativity. In an
increasingly interdependent world, self-authorship often requires people to
undertake voluntary obligations that can be mutually beneficial. But we
face numerous material and cultural impediments. Liberal contract law
responds with diverse contract types, properly understood as a repertoire
of viable options for legitimately enlisting others to our projects in the
core spheres of life.
While at first sight an inventory of contract law doctrines
embedded in an array of contract types may seem confusing, almost
chaotic, the “freedom of contracts” lens opens a new perspective. Our
approach brings focus to the doctrinal muddle and shows that the law’s
varied solutions to recurring bargaining dilemmas are not random. They
271

And it may paradoxically undermine choice and thus autonomy. See
supra text accompanying note 219.
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respond to the spheres of activity in which people contract, and to the
different contractual values people are seeking – from utility to
community. Putting contract law in context transforms seeming chaos
into a coherent legal landscape. “Freedom of contracts” suggests a major
refocus of how contract theory should be pursued – and how contract law
should be designed and taught.

